

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE EVOLUTION OF A JAPANESE THEORY OF
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY**

by

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December 2001

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Report Documentation Page		
Report Date 19 Dec 2001	Report Type N/A	Dates Covered (from... to) -
Title and Subtitle The Evolution of a Japanese Theory of Conflict Management and Implications for Japanese Foreign Policy	Contract Number	
	Grant Number	
	Program Element Number	
Author(s) Ercolano, Michael R.	Project Number	
	Task Number	
	Work Unit Number	
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California	Performing Organization Report Number	
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)	Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(s)	
	Sponsor/Monitor's Report Number(s)	
Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited		
Supplementary Notes		
Abstract		
Subject Terms		
Report Classification unclassified	Classification of this page unclassified	
Classification of Abstract unclassified	Limitation of Abstract UU	
Number of Pages 100		

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2001	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Title (Mix case letters) The Evolution of a Japanese Theory of Conflict Management and Implications for Japanese Foreign Policy			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR Ercolano, III, Michael R.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement (mix case letters) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>This thesis explores whether there is a uniquely Japanese method of conflict management. Given the delicate balance of stability in Northeast Asia, Japanese leadership needs to use conflict management tools to resolve territorial claims with the governments of China, Russia, and South Korea. Given its desire to be a world leader, peaceful settlement of these disputes can enhance Japan's image in the world.</p> <p>Japanese leaders, in the pre-modern era, had adapted Confucian principles of consensus building, order, and harmony to ensure peaceful coexistence. In an effort to be like the West in the late 19th century, late Tokugawa and early Meiji leaders began to copy western ideas concerning what it meant to be a nation which included claiming territory and even going to war to maintain sovereignty interests. In the post-World War II era, Japan was able to return to a more "harmonious" existence and by dealing with its territorial disputes through economic means. Japanese policy makers developed its current foreign policy based on pre-19th century ideals mixed with western realism.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Asian Diplomacy, China, Conflict Management, Cooperation, Decision Making, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Territorial Disputes, United Nations			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 100	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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MANAGEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPANESE FOREIGN
POLICY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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December 2001**


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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores whether there is a uniquely Japanese method of conflict management. Given the delicate balance of stability in Northeast Asia, Japanese leadership needs to use conflict management tools to resolve territorial claims with the governments of China, Russia, and South Korea. Given its desire to be a world leader, peaceful settlement of these disputes can enhance Japan's image in the world.

Japanese leaders, in the pre-modern era, had adapted Confucian principles of consensus building, order, and harmony to ensure peaceful coexistence. In an effort to be like the West in the late 19th century, late Tokugawa and early Meiji leaders began to copy western ideas concerning what it meant to be a nation which included claiming territory and even going to war to maintain sovereignty interests. In the post-World War II era, Japan was able to return to a more "harmonious" existence and by dealing with its territorial disputes through economic means. Japanese policy makers developed its current foreign policy based on pre-19th century ideals mixed with western realism.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my loving family who have put up with the long hours and supported me every step of my professional life.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The end of World War II left a series of territorial disputes that threaten the stability and security of Northeast Asia. In 1998, Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, listed maritime disputes as one of the top three “important challenges to U.S. security policy in the region,” preceded only by Korean unification and a rising economic and military threat from China. He went on to say, “Recent tensions over these conflicting claims have led to an outpouring of nationalistic emotion on all sides, which could preface a future clash among our friends and allies if matters are left unresolved.”¹ Given the delicate balance of stability in the region, Japanese policy makers need to use conflict management theory to resolve these contending disputes. This thesis determines if Japan has a uniquely Japanese method of conflict management and if so, whether it will help settle its own territorial disputes. The thesis will also examine the territorial disputes Japan is having with the governments of China, Russia, and South Korea.

Research for this topic yielded many sources of information, but none of them provided a comprehensive study to address the issue of conflict management in Northeast Asia, let alone Japan. Additionally, there does not seem to be a Japanese specific theory of conflict management. This seems odd considering territorial disputes are not unique to the current security setting. Japanese documents addresses conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Southeast Asia (Sabah, the South China Sea, Cambodia and East Timor, to name a few), however, there are no documents delineating how or why the Japanese government is managing its existing territorial disputes. Japan’s *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000* outlines recommendations for preventing conflict in Southeast Asia.² However, there is no discernable overarching policy on conflict management for the Northeast Asian region. This thesis formulates a Japanese specific theory concerning

¹ Roth, Stanley O., East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony, before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Relations Committee, 7 May 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980507_roth_eastasia.html, 27 May 01.

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000, Toward the 21st Century-Foreign Policy for a Better Future*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/>, 27 May 01. [herein cited: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*]

conflict management, as well as how Japanese leaders might exercise these methods in settling its territorial disputes. Peaceful settlement of these disputes can only enhance Japan's standing in the world given its desires to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

The thesis will be divided into four subsequent chapters: *Conflict Management: Western Theory and Japanese Historical Foundation*; *Western Influence on Japanese Conflict Management: Case Study of Japan's Territorial Disputes*; *The Impact of Japan's Conflict Management Style in Japanese Foreign Policy*; and *Conclusion*. The second chapter will tackle the theoretical aspects of conflict management. It will evaluate western perspectives on contending worldviews, conflict management theory, to include approaches to conflict and cooperation, and the impact of the United Nations in conflict management. Additionally, this chapter will use a historical survey to examine conflict management from a Japanese perspective. Once this theoretical framework is laid out, chapter three will conduct a survey of Japan's territorial disputes will be undertaken, followed by the Cold War and post-Cold War economic and political ramifications of Japan's economic policy. Having delved into this contentious territorial dispute in Northeast Asia, it would be fitting in chapter four to examine Japan's overall foreign policy within the scope of its method of conflict management. The final chapter will summarize the existing Japanese view of conflict management, make recommendations concerning the territorial disputes, as well as comment on a foreign policy direction for Japan and its prospects for the future.

II. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: WESTERN THEORY AND JAPANESE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

The West has many theoretical writings on the subject of conflict management. Initially, this chapter will be a survey of some contending international relations theories on worldviews, conflict management, and cooperation as well as a look at the western developed United Nations on managing and resolving conflicts. Conversely, Japanese literature has few theoretical works on the subject. Consequently, its “theory” will be assessed through a historical survey of Japanese conflict management methods. Once this framework is set, an exploration of Japan’s territorial disputes will demonstrate how Japanese leaders have applied its conflict management methods to address its national interests. Though seemingly inconsequential, these disputes have implications for regional security, stability, and development. Deeply rooted identity issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty further complicate this situation.

Whether one has a realist, liberal, Marxian, or utopian world-view, the fact that conflict exists, or can exist, is universal. Consequently, there are many theories concerning the topic of conflict management. Though there is no one definition of conflict management, many theories have been produced that attempt to explain conflict and ways in which to avoid, prevent, arbitrate, and resolve disputes. Japanese policy makers currently defines conflict prevention in the following manner:³

- efforts to address economic and social issues which could become fundamental causes of future conflict where signs of such conflict have yet to emerge;
- the elimination or alleviation of a political or social structure of confrontation which could escalate into conflict (reconciliation and mediation, etc.);
- peace-making activities directed at ending conflicts which have already broken out; and,
- the maintenance of peace and prevention of conflict recurrence after cease-fires or peace agreements.

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*.

The question arises as to whether this definition is based on a western model or one derived from Japan's historical and cultural tradition. To assess this query, it is important to compare western conflict management and traditional Japanese conflict management. This portion of the thesis examines a western approach to conflict management, and uses a historical survey, to deduce a Japanese theory of conflict management. It is from this newly developed Japanese "theory" that an exploration on how Japanese decision makers can resolve its territorial claims will be conducted.

A. WESTERN APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Based on a leader's perception of the international system, a generalization can be made to determine a country's foreign policy outlook and, quite possibly, foreshadow possible actions in a given environment. In his book *Asian Security Practice*⁴, Muthiah Alagappa presents three worldviews: realism, liberalism, and commercial liberalism. The next couple of paragraphs will explore the relationships between contending worldviews and conflict management.

1. Contending Worldviews

Traditionally, realists subscribe to several tenets. They believe that the international system is anarchic. Out of this anarchy comes the nation state. Hans J. Morgenthau characterized this anarchy as a struggle for power by nation states. The idea of state-centric actors completes the second tenet of realism. This nation state's quest for power is external in nature. Consequently, "[a government's] primary obligation is to the *interests* of the national society it represents, not the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience."⁵ This notion of the separation of domestic politics and foreign policy demonstrates the third principle of realism. Ultimately, the final tenet posits that all the states within the system are equal sovereigns in the international system. Therefore, they compete with one another to seek power. Consequently, the state's survival and advancement is based on its own military might. Survival is equated with self-help, a strong military, and unilateral action between these

⁴ Alagappa, Muthiah, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 51-62. [herein cited Alagappa, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*]

⁵ Kennan, George F., "Morality and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1985/1986, 206.

competitive states.⁶ It is a zero-sum game based on material assets—one nation's gain is another nation's loss. To maintain the status quo, a weak realist needs alliances and balances of power to ward off other nation-states and to provide stability in the system.⁷ Ultimately, states are power maximizers who prefer to be self-dependant in security issues.⁸ Additionally, a state acts rationally to maximize its power; thus, it will not engage in activities that may ultimately destabilize its power. Robert Gilpin summarizes a realist view of international relations this way,

...international politics still can be characterized as it was by Thucydides: the interplay of impersonal forces and great leaders... World politics is still characterized by the struggle of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a coalition of global anarchy. Nuclear weapons have not made the resort to force irrelevant; economic interdependence does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy.⁹

Whereas realists are more pessimistic about international relations, liberals share a more optimistic view. According to Jeffry Frieden and David Lake in their article "International Politics and International Economics," liberalism has three basic tenets.¹⁰ The first is that an individual or non-state actor is the basic unit of measure. This is a stark contrast to the realist state-centric international system. Consequently, domestic agendas, non-governmental organizations, and individual rights can dictate the politics within the international system. The second tenet subscribes to the idea that these individuals are rational and seek to maximize profit or some other personal stake. This should not be confused with a zero-sum mentality but rather comparative gains such that all parties involved will desire to continue to work together toward a beneficial end. This leads to the final principle, which states that the best way to achieve this maximum value

⁶ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 105-107.

⁷ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), 123-131.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁹ Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 11.

¹⁰ Frieden, Jeffry A., and David A. Lake, "International Politics and International Economics," in Goddard, C. Rose, John T. Passe-Smith, and John G. Conklin (eds.), *International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order*, (Boulder Rienner, 1996), 26-28.

is through exchange with others. Ultimately, for liberals to maximize their value, there must be harmony in the system. The method to ensure this harmony is by ensuring that exchanges result in a positive sum gain for all participants. Since disharmony and war disrupt efforts for positive gain, cooperation and communication among individuals will aid in diffusing conflicts due to the established means of communication and desires to continue profitable relations. The resulting cooperation happens in spite of the anarchic international system and eventually leads to a maturing and ordered system. Liberal models within the international system vary from altruistic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, which maximizes value by aiding others in need, to the United Nations, which maximizes its own prestige and stature while intervening in a wide array of international roles and functions. This liberalized system puts a lot of credit behind laws and organizations to produce a dependant society that will grow in harmony. When disputes arise, a liberal will turn to existing organizations for arbitration and all nation-states will abide by the decisions in the best interests of the community.

The economic offshoot of the liberal theory is the commercial liberal approach. Commercial liberals base the maturing process of the international system on economic interdependence rather than international organizations, laws, and courts. “The relatively low cost of trade and its increasing benefits, the growing cost of force and its diminishing returns, and social learning that will occur... can move international relations in the direction of a ‘trading world’ characterized by interdependence based on differentiation in functions and reciprocity.”¹¹ Joseph Nye’s theory of neo-functionalism and regionalism broadens yet clearly defines how this interdependence occurs. In his book *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations*, Nye lists the seven process mechanisms that states go through as they interact with one another - inadvertent linkages, rising transactions, coalition forming, socialization, regional formations, regional identity, and external spill-over. Each of these steps spill-over into the next,

¹¹ Alagappa, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, 53.

creating a more mature interdependent system.¹² Consequently, states will cooperate with one another so as not to interrupt the economic prosperity they all share in. The European Union epitomizes Nye's idea of regional functionalism. What started out originally as a trade and coal partnership between France and Germany in the early 1950s developed into the matured economic community in Europe. It is similar cooperation that allows competing states to manage potential conflicts that may arise.

2. Conflict Management Theory

Conflict management is a generic term also based on cooperation and is used to explain the methods in which actors within the international system deal with change or conflict. The preferred result is to resolve the conflict peacefully, but a country's worldview will set-up the parameters in which the conflict will be evaluated. For example, a realist would assume — given the anarchic and zero-sum nature of international politics — that *war* is the only true method of resolving conflict. A liberal, on the other hand, may advocate an *arbiter* or *mediator* to address the issue of contention. Still again, a commercial liberal may *avoid* the conflict all together to ensure a working peace is maintained. Given these contending worldview theories, one can explore how international actors may approach conflicts.

a. Approaches to Conflict

According to Joseph Nye, "Since recurrent armed conflicts are frequently the product of enduring rivalries between pairs of hostile states, addressing and resolving animosities and problems in particular relationships is clearly a way to avert violent conflicts."¹³ The Prussian military theorist and writer, Carl von Clausewitz tells us that war is an instrument of a nation's policy and that its aim is to impose this policy, or will, on the other nation. Clausewitz was obviously a realist and helped shape the traditional explanation of why nations go to war. Unfortunately, this does not explain how or why nations should avoid war. Clausewitz's theory of war is based on a zero-sum game.

¹² Nye, Joseph S., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations*, (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1987), 64 - 75.

¹³ Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention Management, and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1999), 105. [herein cited: Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*].

Simply put, for Nation A to impose its will on Nation B, Nation A must win and Nation B must lose. However, is this necessarily the case?




Figure 1. Five Approaches to Conflict¹⁴

Conflict resolution explores the idea of achieving mutually beneficial terms to resolve a dispute through cooperation. This entails caring about the outcome not only from Nation A's perspective but that of Nation B as well. This relationship of concern is demonstrated in Figure 1. If Nation A is concerned more about its goals than those of Nation B, then you have conflict as Nation A attempts to impose its will on Nation B. When Nation A gives up its goals in favor of Nation B then Nation A is yielding because it feels Nation B's will is greater than Nation A's will. However, if there is low concern for Nation A's goals, then Nation A will avoid conflict because the costs outweigh the benefits. The middle segment represents the situation where there is equal concern between Nations A and B and that they will compromise in a negotiated settlement. The ultimate goal is for Nations A and B to both achieve their goal, in which the conflict has been permanently resolved. This may be easier said than done. However, Robert Axelrod and Anatol Rapoport offer some compelling theories on the importance of cooperation in resolving conflicts.

b. The Role of Cooperation in Resolving Conflicts

Both realists and liberals concur that nations cooperate with one another to realize mutual benefit and advantage even though there is a state of anarchy in the

¹⁴ Ibid., 6.

international system.¹⁵ Realists, however, believe this cooperation is mutually beneficial in limited situations such as allying against a common neighbor or deciding on telecommunications or railroad track gauge.¹⁶ Empirical data for cooperation theory derives from various sources most notably the work done by Robert Axelrod and his Prisoner's Dilemma.¹⁷

The Prisoner's Dilemma demonstrates the power of cooperation.¹⁸ Robert Axelrod set up a game theory around a seemingly simple scenario. The following analogy was developed for ease of understanding. A bomber is shot down over enemy territory after a successful bombing run. The pilot and co-pilot are taken prisoner. They are kept in different cells and asked to divulge information about which of the two is the one who actually released the bombs—the captors only want to kill the bomber. If Prisoner A *defects* and blames Prisoner B, then Prisoner A is set free and Prisoner B is executed. If both Prisoner A and B *defect* and blame each other, then both are tortured until the truth is known. However, if both *cooperate*, and remain silent or tell the same story then the captors would look elsewhere. Obviously, there is the chance for the following situations: lose-lose (both being tortured), win-lose (one is set free and the other is killed), and win-win (the captors look elsewhere). The dilemma created is that two self-interested prisoners who *defect* in hopes of release can be caught in a lose-lose situation indefinitely.

Unfortunately, the Prisoner's Dilemma can only be used once with human subjects. If used in a series, then there is the possibility that cooperative behavior can develop.¹⁹ Consequently, Anatol Rapoport set up a computer simulation of the Prisoner's

¹⁵ Fearon, James D., "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring 1998, 269. [herein cited: Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation"].

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 269-270.

¹⁷ While there are a great many works by Robert Axelrod on cooperation, game theory, and decision-making, my research on the Prisoner's Dilemma comes from his book, *The Evolution of Cooperation*.

¹⁸ Axelrod, Robert M., *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), 206-207.

¹⁹ Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 8. The idea behind the original study was to determine the unbiased responses to the circumstances.

Dilemma and tried to evaluate the best strategy given the same scenario. The best statistical strategy was found when both parties would cooperate until one tried to get one up on the other. In turn, the “loser” of the previous engagement tried to go up on the other. This interchange became known as tit-for-tat (TFT). Since the TFT strategy resulted in either a loss or a tie in every pairing, over the long run (62 exchanges), the TFT strategy compiled the most beneficial statistical outcome overall.²⁰ This was accomplished because the TFT strategy never fully committed to an all or nothing attitude but rather alternated to match its opponent; consequently limiting and ultimately avoiding the potential for the lose-lose outcomes.

c. Achieving Cooperation

In both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Tit-for-Tat, it is evident that cooperation, and placing importance on the other person’s interests, can prevent the lose-lose situation. Third parties to a conflict can intervene and help bridge the conflicting parties toward the ultimate goal of cooperation. Sometimes this is easier said than done. To cooperate there must be an understanding of each side’s positions, interests, and needs.²¹ This understanding can come in the forms of negotiation, arbitration, or mediation.

Negotiation occurs when the two parties talk it out themselves and come to a compromise or agreement. Arbitrators (“mediators with muscle”²²) tend to use some sort of power base from which to operate. It can be through the enforcement of laws, military might, or coercion of some other sort. On the other hand, mediators tend to resolve conflict through “communication and facilitation.”²³ These mediators may operate within the existing framework, which generally produces results in the forms of bargaining or compromises. The truly successful mediators, however, create new frameworks that transform the problem into something that benefits both parties.

²⁰ Rapoport, Anatol, *The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995) 273-274, 558 - 559.

²¹ Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 9.

²² Ibid., 11.

²³ Ibid., 11.

The United Nations and its Security Council was created by the United States and its Allies after World War II as a method to avoid another world war. It was to be the western led allies' method of addressing conflict management in the future. This western dominated organization is a model that has survived over half a decade and interceded in a multitude of conflicts to ensure the peace and stability of the world as defined by its predominantly western permanent Security Council members. Consequently, examining its structure and methods of working through conflict will be beneficial since the Japanese aspire to join this group.

3. The United Nations and Conflict Management

During intense conflict situations, it may take a third person to step between opposing parties to manage a dispute. The United Nations' charter establishes the UN as an open forum in which countries can approach one another equally to discuss their grievances. Through this forum, an exchange of views between the disputants may yield a peaceful resolution through settlement. Conflict management, and its eventual resolution, is seen as a wiser and more civilized approach to the age-old dilemma of war. The general idea behind conflict management and its effectiveness is based on proactiveness and understanding by the parties involved. Though it may seem novel, conflict resolution has been around since at least the Greek times, with the existence of the Delian League and its balance of power strategy. This early Greek organization had regulated trade between its members, as well as proposing a system within which to provide for conflict resolution that might arise due to trading as well as dealing with neighboring but non-aligning states. In today's maturing international system, nations are moving from the traditional balance of power of yore and progressing toward coalitions, a system afforded to the international system by the United Nations' charter, which recommends methods of conflict resolution. Article 33, paragraph 1, states:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of the international peace and security, shall, first seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other means of their choice.²⁴

²⁴ *United Nations Charter*, <http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html>, 8 October 01.

There are various aspects of conflict management in the UN charter as mentioned in Riggs and Plano's book *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*.²⁵ Negotiation is timeless in its applicability. Consequently, it is generally the first step that nation-states avail themselves of when involved in a dispute. Negotiation is the traditional form of diplomatic communication between opposing forces. Good communication, whether public or private, goes a long way in airing out grievances and misunderstandings, as well as potentially deterring armed conflict. Most disputes arise due to misperceptions of existing facts. Questions over facts might escalate to a greater conflict in some disputes. UN inquiries dispute questions of fact using an impartial commission. If, through inquiries, the problems are deeper than a misunderstanding or otherwise routine matter of fact, a mediator might need to become involved.

Mediation enlists the active participation of a third party. This person then makes recommendations on possible proposals, or settlements. Generally both parties agree on the mediator and, in turn, openly disclose all pertinent information. Ultimately, the mediator assists the conflicting parties in resolving the conflict rather than imposing a settlement upon them. In cases where the parties just cannot agree on a settlement, then an arbitration process may occur. Arbitration gives both disputants free choice of selecting judges. In return, they agree to show respect for the settlement mandated. This is because there is no obligation for sovereign states to comply with international judgements. The Secretary-General can act as a third party, with the added influence his position may bring.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is yet another tool available to assist in resolving disputes should negotiation, mediation, and arbitration fail. ICJ is a fully funded organ of the United Nations. The primary problem is the ICJ has no real jurisdictional enforcement. Though states are not bound to the jurisdiction of the court, court deliberations and findings can factor into a leader's future decisions. It is only through bilateral and multilateral treaties that a state may be forced to consent to the court's jurisdiction. Article 6, paragraph 2 has the "optional clause" which gives states

²⁵ Riggs, Robert E., and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*, (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988)

the option of falling under the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Whether or not there is compliance with specific rulings, nations do take notice of the international precedents set.

Another way in which the United Nations may deal with an issue of conflict is to delegate an issue to the region. The rationale is that only the local regions could fully understand and empathize with the situation at hand. During the Cold War, regional actors or organizations would rather work out issues themselves instead of having a larger third party imposing themselves within the region with their own agendas. This could potentially open the door for greater instability within the region and not resolve the issue at hand. Since the end of the Cold War, regional diversity has proved too complex for larger powers to manage. Consequently, the UN has been able to allow regional actors to take a more active role in their respective regions.

At the end of World War II, the victorious powers set up the UN to avoid future wars. Article 33, paragraph 1, of the UN charter verbally establishes the international desire to use conflict management to address contending issues. Given Japan's economic power and Tokyo's ambition to join the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Japan may be the bridge between this western-led forum of conflict management and the rest of the world. This will further legitimize the UN as a means of managing conflicts in the future. While this would seem to be a desirable outcome, a survey of Japanese conflict management is required to ensure a firm understanding of the Japanese point of view. The next section will access this viewpoint.

B. SURVEY OF JAPANESE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Research has yielded no concise theory on Japanese conflict management concerning Japan, or anywhere else in Northeast Asia. This can be attributed to the geographic isolation of pre-Perry Japan and that Japanese "foreign" policy was more "domestically" focused. Feudal Japan resembled feudal Europe and though a Treaty of Westphalia did not create a nation-state system on the island of Japan, similar state relationships evolved between the clans. Therefore, the following section will be a survey of historical indicators to assist in developing a working definition of what Japanese conflict management has been - from their traditional era to the present.

This survey will establish that Japanese ideals of foreign policy are more dialectical and avoid the confrontational zero-sum characteristics of decision making in the West. Japan does not have the long history of dealing with issues of ethics and foreign policy found in the West;²⁶ however, social order has always been important. As such, internal methods of managing conflict have developed. Consequently, these traditional methods, as well as post-Perry methods, will be evaluated to understand how Japanese leaders react to solving disputes. The following survey of Japanese conflict management takes us back to Japan's traditional era.

1. Early Japan - Japanese Confucian State (660 BC–1185)

Though there is archeological and anthropological evidence to support an early civilization and contact with Asian neighbors (at least 10,000 BC), Japan claims its mythological existence back to 660 BC. It is not until 57 AD, however, that an emissary made his way to the Han Court of China.²⁷ It is from the Chinese that the Japanese learned their earliest foundations in government and foreign relations in the ordered form of Confucianism. Japanese scholars learned of Confucius and developed strong Confucian ties, which delineated a hierarchy with China in the middle and other kingdoms, such as Japan, in the periphery of the expansive influence of China. China maintained suzerainty over its younger neighbors and a tributary system was established. An Asian, pre-modern conception of territory was based on cultures and “floating zones” and peripheries.²⁸ While no country had truly clear territorial boundaries, the Japanese islands ensured a certain amount of autonomy from Chinese influence. However, one could argue that since Chinese emperors had some sort of suzerainty over all Asian territories, and allowed other kingdoms to manage territory on the periphery of China,

²⁶ Gabrielson, Jon R., *The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An Alliance Based on “Shared Values and Interests”* (Thesis), June 2000, Naval Postgraduate School, 48. [herein cited: Gabrielson, *The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An Alliance Based on “Shared Values and Interests”*].

²⁷ Tsunoda, Ryusaku, Wm. Theodore de Barry, and Donald Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1958) 3-4. [herein cited: Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*].

²⁸ Holsti, Kalevi J., “The Changing Nature of International Institutions: The Case of Territoriality,” Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 32, November 2000, 3-5.

any suzerains to Chinese leadership would not encroach upon another's territory without consent from the Chinese court.

There were great changes occurring around Japan from the mid-sixth century to the mid-seventh century. The Japanese presence in Korea had been removed from the peninsula. Japan's Korean ally, Paekche, was eventually defeated by the Silla Kingdom, which ultimately united the peninsula in 668. In addition, the Sui (581-618), and later T'ang (618 – 907), Dynasties established a large united dominion in China. The rise of strong neighbors seemed to weaken further a fragmented Japan, as clans fought in the midst of cultural and economic upheavals. The Japanese civilization needed strengthening, and a sovereign who could intercede.²⁹

Prince Shōtoku Taishi, a devout Buddhist, pointed toward Confucianism as a means to provide stability and refocus Japan. Prince Shōtoku relied heavily on the Confucian ethical and political doctrines to achieve the uniformity and centrality of the past Chinese dynasties and kingdoms;³⁰ however, he ensured a Buddhist religious belief system that was not dependant on its Chinese originators. (Whenever there was a conflict between the two belief systems, Confucianism was looked to for secular matters, while Buddhism maintained spiritual guidance.³¹) In 604 AD, Japanese leader Prince Shōtoku is said to have developed the *Seventeen-Article Constitution*. This provides a basic step to understanding Japanese order and conflict management. It was based on moral concepts of right and wrong, good and evil, vice power politics and expediency, even at the expense of individual rights and freedoms. Harmony was key. The highest commitment to society in Japan was to be loyal to the society itself;³² public good was placed above private interests.³³ This is exemplified in Article I, which states:

²⁹ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 36-37.

³⁰ Ibid., 49-50. Though the Sui Dynasty used the legalist theory of rule, Prince Shōtoku idealized the early-Confucian models of discipline and control of the pre-Sui dynasties and kingdoms.

³¹ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 38.

³² Christopher, Robert C., *The Japanese Mind*, (New York, NY: Fawcett Columbine, 1984), 55.

³³ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 49.

Harmony should be valued and *quarrels should be avoided*. Everyone has his biases, and few men are far-sighted. Therefore, some disobey their lords and fathers and keep up feuds with their neighbors. *But when the superiors are in harmony with each other and the inferiors are friendly, then affairs are discussed quietly and the right view of matters prevails.*³⁴

This harmony was not enough though. The “constitution” realized conflicts would arise and that they needed to be resolved peacefully. The last article is dedicated to resolving these conflicts.

*Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many people. Small matters are of less consequence and it is unnecessary to consult a number of people. It is only in the case of important affairs, when there is a suspicion that they may miscarry that one should consult with others, so as to arrive at the right conclusion.*³⁵

Article XVII states unilateral decisions in “weighty affairs” can cause harm or miscarry. Additionally, consensus of action prevents mistakes made in haste and without proper thought.

Though not an actual constitution, these guidelines provided the Japanese people with their first sense of identity and nationalism. This provided a basis from which all Japanese people would aspire and relate to others. These uniquely Japanese ideals framed its foreign policy. This distinction allowed the Japanese to think of themselves as separate from the prevailing Chinese suzerainty, even though using and adapting a Chinese belief system to call their own. From the fourth to the eighth century, Japanese leaders continued to select and adapt foreign concepts and make them uniquely Japanese.³⁶

³⁴ Columbia University, East Asian Curriculum Project, “The Constitution of Prince Shōtoku,” Contemporary Japan: A Teaching Workbook, <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/japanworks/teachingaids/japan/japanworkbook/traditional/Shōtoku.htm>, 7 June 2001. [Emphasis added]. [herein cited: Columbia University, “The Constitution of Prince Shōtoku”].

³⁵ Ibid. [Emphasis added.].

³⁶ Gabrielson, *The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An Alliance Based on “Shared Values and Interests,”* 54.

The traditional era has defined the Japanese people from its Asian neighbors, as the Japanese believed they could trace their origins from the gods.³⁷ This society placed the public good ahead of individual interests. To ensure this community focus, important decisions were to be derived from communication and consensus building to ensure there were no missteps in Japan's continued quest for greatness. Throughout the rest of this traditional era, Japanese leaders worked internally to improve its government, arts, Buddhist ties and understanding, and culture. One of these "improvements" to the government was the establishment of strong households, or clans (*uji*), who ran the country in the Emperor's name. Unfortunately, this would lead to infighting and eventually to the establishment of a feudal system of governance.

2. Feudal Japan - A Decentralized System (1185–1600)

Courtly politics began to incite competing interests and claims over the throne. Military battles ensued and militarized clans centered in Kamakura seized power and "assisted" the emperor in running the country. These military rulers were referred to as *shoguns*. Law in Japan, as has been demonstrated, aspired to prevent conflict through interpersonal harmony.³⁸ Consequently, to ensure their strength in Japanese internal politics, the Kamakura Shogunate published the *Jōie Shikimoku* (code of the Kamakura Shogunate) in 1232. Among other things, it provided a means of settling disputes. The code stated no matter who started a land dispute; both parties were guilty and ran the risk of losing their land, life, or both – usually both.³⁹ This basic tenet of territorial disputes survived for six centuries. Of course, this was for internal matters but the idea of social order presided over individual gain.

Between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, Buddhism flourished and Zen monks became the secular advisors on foreign affairs.⁴⁰ The monks were considered

³⁷ It was not until the eighth century, that Japan developed a unique creation story (*The Record of Ancient Matters* or *Kojiki*, [712].) that established a direct lineage of its people and islands from the gods (*Chronicles of Japan* or *Nihongi*, [720].).

³⁸ Gabrielson, *The Changing Application of Norms to Foreign Policy in U.S.-Japan Relations: An Alliance Based on "Shared Values and Interests,"* 45.

³⁹ Varley, H. Paul, "The Age of Military Houses," in Arthur E. Tiedemann's (ed.), *An Introduction to Japanese Civilization*, (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), 66.

⁴⁰ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 261-262.

enlightened warriors who were schooled in protecting life and the court rather than killing and war.⁴¹ Their expansive knowledge of China and Chinese ways allowed them to function as mediators in trade negotiations and matters of the court. The education and utility of these Zen monks became the foundation of the aristocratic *samurai* class in the Tokugawa period.

In 1343, scholar Kitabatake Chikafusa re-enforced Japanese uniqueness within the world with his *Jinno shōtō-ki* (The Records of the Legitimate Succession of the Divine Sovereigns). It is here that Shintoism evolved from an animistic study of *kami* (spirits) and became synonymous with Japan and being Japanese. This declaration of uniqueness did not reject foreign schools of thought (which had provided past foundations of Japanese government and belief) but rather showed how they were imperfect in their understanding of Shinto (read Japanese) principles.⁴²

Provincial leaders needed to ensure order within their locality. Usually they used the Shogunate's edicts as a guide to assist in this task. At times, however, the provincial leaders would supplement the edicts as necessary. The following quote comes from a provincial edict in the mid-fifteenth century: "All quarrels and disputes are strictly forbidden. If this is disobeyed, both sides will be put to death, without inquiry into right and wrong."⁴³ Internal dissent was considered a source of weakness in feudal Japan and was stomped out.

One year later in 1467, the Shogunate lost centralized control of the provincial lords and the Onin War began. Though this particular war lasted only ten years, it kicked off a period known as the Warring States Period (*sengoku jidai*). During this period, there were continual attempts to centralize control over all Japan. It was not until 1568, when Oda Nobunaga began to unify Japan. After Oda's death in 1582, his most successful general, Hideyoshi, continued Oda Nobunaga's campaign to unify Japan and almost succeeded in 1590. To maintain his centralized control, Hideyoshi issued several

⁴¹ Ibid., 263.

⁴² Ibid., 274.

⁴³ Sansom, G. B., *Japan: A Short Cultural History*, Revised Edition, (New York, NY: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1962), 427.

edicts, similar to those of his predecessors. One of these edicts discussed the importance of domestic harmony:

If farmers possess only agricultural implements and devote themselves exclusively to cultivating the fields, they and their descendants will prosper. This compassionate concern for the well-being of the farms is the reason for the issuance of this edict, and such a concern is the foundation *for the peace and security of the country and the joy and happiness of all the people*.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, Hideyoshi's compassion for domestic peace did not transfer toward its foreign policy. No sooner did Hideyoshi unite most of Japan than he turned his military forces against China, through an unyielding Korea. Hideyoshi died before Japan was forced to withdraw in 1598, after a fierce Chinese defense. His successor Tokugawa Ieyasu, was the most powerful regional military lord, *daimyo*, and ascended to the rank to Shogun in 1603 unifying all of Japan and marking the beginning of a 250 year Tokugawa Peace.

The feudal period as a whole demonstrated conflict management skills in the form of forced compliance through a strong centralized power. This seemed to work initially nationally, but the Shogunate soon lost control and faced great despair as regional lords competed with one another to claim the title of Shogun. Even with the competing struggles for power, the trend of Japanese uniqueness reasserted itself in the form of Shintoism. This "national" religion created an identity that reinforced the idea of domestic harmony in the midst of political strife. This harmony rose to satisfy the domestic politics even though the Hideyoshi regime initiated hostilities against its neighbors. Tokugawa Ieyasu recognized the benefits and faults of the last four centuries and was able to reestablish a new peace and method of managing conflict.

3. Tokugawa Japan – Authoritarian Peace (1600–1868)

Within the first decade of his rule, Tokugawa issued the "Laws Governing Military Households" in 1615. It was a series of edicts concerning behavior and conduct of the provincial military elite. Most of the laws kept the *daimyo* and their families dependent either physically, economically, domestically, or spiritually on the emperor

⁴⁴ Lu, David, *Japan: A Documentary History*, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997). [herein cited: Lu, *Japan: A Documentary History*].

and the Shogun. Of particular note in this survey of conflict management is the first article:

Both [literature and arms] must be pursued concurrently. Archery and horsemanship are essential skills for military men. *It is said that war is a curse. However, it is resorted to only when it is inevitable.* In time of peace, do not forget the possibility of disturbances. Train yourself and be prepared.⁴⁵

The fact that war is a curse and should be avoided seems to foreshadow future edicts Japanese policy makers would have place on the Japanese and regulating the government. In an effort to avoid conflict internally and externally, the Tokugawa Shogunate issued a series of laws, against foreigners, which closed Japan off from the rest of the world.⁴⁶ Edo was able to control the amount and type of trade of items traded to ensure sources of power (i.e.: firearms) did not challenge the existing political structure. This isolationist tendency was altered slightly in the 1640s to allow for trade in remote ports of the island so as not to influence and corrupt the existing structure established. This self-imposed isolation (*sakoku*) and edict to military households were not enough however to ensure tight control. Tokugawa turned to the *samurai* who lost their masters because of fighting and land consolidation.

During the feudal period, a large group of unemployed warriors and aristocracy were available for hire to protect weaker lords from meeting the same fate as their previous masters. These early *ronin* allowed weaker lords to apply the lessons of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu. During Warring States period (405 BC – 233 BC) in China's history, Sun Tzu expressed the dire nature of armed conflict and gave details on how to avoid conflict at all costs. Armed conflicts generally meant that a loss on the battlefield, meant a loss of sovereignty and survivability, which was more important than territory –very similar to what the Japanese lords were facing in during Japan's feudalistic period. This furthers the idea that territory was not worth the costs of an armed conflict and resolution by other means ensured survivability of the clan and its holdings. Sun Tzu suggested ways to collect intelligence, use spies, posturing, and

⁴⁵ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 327. Emphasis added.

⁴⁶ Lu, *Japan: A Documentary History*, 191-192; and Totman, Conrad, "Tokugawa Japan," in Arthur E. Tiedemann's (ed.), *An Introduction to Japanese Civilization*, (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), 122 – 123.

subterfuge to maintain the “peace.” In effect, the best way to win a war was not to fight one; and the best way not to fight one is to convince your enemy you are not any easy target; hence the mass hiring of *ronin*. Tokugawa met the *ronin* problem by hiring the *ronin* for non-military governmental positions and giving stipends similar to those received by the other *samurai* of their status.⁴⁷

The Tokugawa period turned to Confucianism with the Japanese twist of Shintoism to achieve social peace and order. This merging, *Bushido*, took the order and discipline of Confucianism, with Japanese feudal traditions, and places them in service of the Emperor.⁴⁸ Tokugawa capitalized on the previous success of developing a social contract of harmony and coexistence while co-opting potential threats with money and governmental positions. This pragmatic mix of tradition and compromise ensured domestic tranquility during this period.

4. Summary of Pre-Modern Japanese Conflict Management

The traditional era of Japan began in some obscurity. Its socio-political roots seemed to have derived from Chinese Confucianism. However, while Korea seemed to take Confucianism lock, stock, and barrel, Japanese elites were quite choosy when it came to Confucianism to establish the earliest governmental guidelines. With an infusion of Buddhist principles, and Shinto creation myth, Japanese scholars were well on their way to creating Japan as something similar to, yet different from, its Asian neighbors. This uniqueness created a society where individualness was set aside to create and maintain a peaceful and harmonious society. This society still realized the importance of individual contributions to the extent that “weighty” decisions must be made in a group. This was to ensure that all sides and theories were listened to before a rush to decision. It is without consensus that poor decisions can be made and harmony disrupted.

During the Kamakura Shogunate, unfortunately, there was anarchy and no peace. In the beginning of this era, leaders created a Japanese identity and nationalistic sense for their people even before Japan was really a nation. Not only were the Japanese people different from their Asian neighbors, but also those neighbors fell short in the Shinto

⁴⁷ Totman, “Tokugawa Japan,” 123.

⁴⁸ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 308-309.

principles that the Japanese had been following all along. The warriors were at the top of the social ladder and were the provincial leaders. The Warring States period demonstrated a different form of conflict management that utilized strong localized control to prevent internal unrest and posturing to prevent other *daimyo* from attacking. This posturing came in many forms; most notably the hiring of masterless warriors, *ronin*, to help ward off pending attacks. Eventually, the strongest clan won out and united the nation.

The Tokugawa era turned back the hands of time and used the principles that were successful during the early traditional rule period – society before self, consensus rule (as set forth by the Shogun), and harmony. To assist in this quest, and to prevent the seeds of revolution, the Tokugawa Shoguns prevented foreign influence by closing up the ports and limiting contact with foreigners. Tokugawa Japan also captivated the warriors with a new martial spirit of *Bushido*, which allowed them to operate freely yet, still be loyal to the Emperor. This indentured relationship, tied with strict guidelines on conduct, and administrative positions, allowed the Tokugawa Shogunate to effectively remove the internal military threat to secure internal peace while ensuring a ready force should an external power attempt to enter Japan.

III. WESTERN INFLUENCE ON JAPANESE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDY OF JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Before 1854, when Commodore Perry's Black Ship cast its shadow in Edo (Tokyo) Bay, Tokugawa Japan was a self-imposed isolationist nation. Its internal make-up was feudal in nature with a divine Emperor as its sovereign and a militaristic Shogunate as its ruler. For 250 years, the Japanese people were at peace and content with its development and status in the world.

A. THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL POWER AND THE BEGINNING OF ITS TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

The appearance of the Perry delegation to establish coaling rights, fair treatment of lost sailors, and terms of friendship and trade with Japan was an affront to Japanese sensibilities. The subsequent unequal treaties (treaty port system, most favored nation, and extraterritoriality) symbolized a forfeiture of "national honor" due to the concessions that were made to the West.⁴⁹ The Japanese government realized it was no match militarily for the West so it set out on a journey of discovery and knowledge to learn, and re-negotiate, using western diplomacy. The West stated that these treaties would remain in place until Japanese officials made major legal and constitutional reforms. As a consequence, the Iwakura mission took place from 1871 to 1873 with the intent to learn from western culture and develop Japan into a "prosperous country and a strong army." In the mid-1870s, Japanese policy makers adopted a more assertive foreign policy that embodied a crash course in western colonial programs.⁵⁰ The idea of territory and trade equated to national power in western terms. While Japanese elites did not want Japan to be a western power, they did want Japan to be seen as a powerful nation to its new western "friends" and imposers of unequal treaties. The following section will demonstrate how Japanese decision makers secured areas of interest and influence to the north, west, and south. Ultimately, even after the Sino-Japanese, Russo-Japanese, and two world wars, these territories are still in dispute.

⁴⁹ Duus, Peter, *Modern Japan*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1998) 135. [herein cited: Duus, *Modern Japan*].

⁵⁰ Ibid., 135.

1. Japan and the Northern Frontier

At dispute are four islands off the tip of Japan's northern island, Hokkaido.

Japan's claim to the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles (Japan/Russia) is through the Russo-Japanese Friendship treaties of 1855 and 1875. Russia claims the territories in dispute through World War II treaties and agreements. Currently, Russia maintains sovereignty over the islands in dispute.

Japan and Russia have a long and contentious history in the Kurile Islands. Cossack trappers in search of seal and sea otter hides came from the north in the late eighteenth century only to be turned away by the Tokugawa regime. In 1855, the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation (a.k.a. the Shimoda Treaty) established Japanese sovereignty over the four southern Kurile Islands (Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu), while the remaining islands north of Etorofu belonged to Russia. The Japanese government furthers their argument by stating that Commodore Putyatin, the Russian representative for the Shimoda Treaty, and Czar Nicholas I recognized Russia's southern most boundary as Uruppu, the island north of Etorofu.⁵¹ Since the island of Sakhalin (*Karafuto* in Japanese) was still in dispute, an 1875 Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands was signed between Russia and Japan. The treaty stipulated that Japan ceded sovereign interests in Sakhalin Islands to Russia. In exchange, Russia would yield the remaining 18 Kurile Islands, north of Etorofu and south of the Kamchatka Peninsula, to Japan. After the Russo-Japanese War, the 1905 Portsmouth Peace Treaty granted Japan control over southern Sakhalin, as well as recognizing Japan's interest in the Korean Peninsula. Japanese officials maintained administrative control of these territories until the end of World War II.

2. Japan and the Sea of Japan/East Sea

While the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 finalized Japan's territorial interests in the northern frontier and Korea, it signified the beginning of a territorial dispute in the Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea in Korea). Tokdo (Korea), Takeshima (Japan)⁵², or

⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Northern Territories*, www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/index.html, 1 May 01. [herein cited MOFA, *Japan's Northern Territories*]

⁵² While Japan and Korea have names reflected their native tongue for these islets, the same Kanji ideographs are used to denote the territory as the "Bamboo Islands".

Liancourt Rocks (United Kingdom) is a group of two islets and 33 rock formations located 49 nm from South Korea and 86 nm from Japan. Seoul claims sovereignty over Tokdo after conquest of the territory in 512. Japanese leaders, on the other hand, claim Takeshima based on international law as spelled out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Foreign Ministry of Japan states, “Takeshima Island is an integral part of Japanese territory... There is no question about this.”⁵³ Tokyo is asking an international court to settle the dispute while the ROK vehemently opposes this measure. The government of South Korea currently possesses the territory and the formerly uninhabited islands have a migrated population that is supplied via helicopter by the ROK.

Historically, Tokdo was originally its own domain (Usan-guk), and it was incorporated into the Silla Kingdom in 512 as recorded in the *Samguk-sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms)* of 1145.⁵⁴ After the conquest, it was referred to as Usando and changed to Tokdo in 1883.⁵⁵ North Korean leaders support the South Korean government’s claim. Various Japanese maps and publications support Korea’s possession of the territory. The *Onshu Shicho Goki (What Was Seen or Heard About Onshu)* of 1667, and *Sankoku Setsujo Chizu (A Territorial Map of Three Nations)* of 1785 depict Usando (Tokdo) as a part of the Korea.⁵⁶ In the mid-seventeenth century, it appears Japanese leaders claimed the islands but appeared to allow Korea to take sovereignty during the Tokugawa era.⁵⁷ This forfeiture could additionally fortify a Korean claim based on prescription or the notion of unfettered possession over time.

⁵³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Conference by the Press Secretary, June 3, 1997* [translated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs], <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/4/424.html>, 27 May 01.

⁵⁴ Korean Educational Development Institute, *Facts and Fallacies about Korea*, (Seoul, South Korea: Korean Educational Development Institute, 1998) 117-118. [herein cited: Korean Educational Development Institute, *Facts and Fallacies about Korea*].

⁵⁵ Ibid., 117; and, Xu, Baokang, “ROK-Japan Dispute over Island,” *Renmin Ribao*, [FBIS-CHI-96-035], 21 February 1996.

⁵⁶ Korean Educational Development Institute, *Facts and Fallacies about Korea*, 118.

⁵⁷ Pratt, Keith, Richard Rutt, and James Hoare, *Korea: A Historical and Cultural Dictionary*, (Richmond Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1999) 473.

In 1876, taking a page from the United States' gunboat diplomacy, Japanese officials sent its own black ship to Korea and the Treaty of Kanghwa opened Korea to Japanese traders, diplomats, and soon the West. Japanese interests in Korea and China competed with those interests of the Russian czar led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. As a result of the Russo-Japanese War and subsequent Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, the Japanese government re-established its influence over Korea and its territories. All of Korea, to include Tokdo, was made a Japanese protectorate and Japanese officials administered the island's fishing resources as its own until the end of World War II.

3. Japan and its Southern Boundary

To the southwest is the final territorial dispute Japan has with its neighbors, the People's Republic of China and Republic of China. At dispute are five uninhabited islands and three rocky outcroppings. They are situated 190 mi. west of Okinawa and 200 mi. east of Taiwan covering an area of 7-sq. km. on the edge of the Asian continental shelf on the Chinese side of the Okinawan Trough. Although Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces actively patrol the area, Chinese leaders claim historical precedent since naming them Diaoyutai (Fishing Islands) in the fifteenth century. The Japanese refer to the territories as Senkaku-jima (Pointed House Islands) and claim sovereignty because of discovering previously unclaimed territory. (This variation in names is a source of confusion for outsiders and can potentially create further complications should the dispute be resolved when correcting maps and the like.) Currently, Japan maintains sovereignty and patrols the waters of the islands but there are no inhabitants.

Early Meiji leaders' quest to solidify Japan's southern boarder led to a 1871 friendship treaty with the China recognizing Japanese interests in the region of the Ryukyus. However, in 1874, Japanese leaders resorted to "saber rattling" to secure more than just interests in the region.⁵⁸ After a legalistic misstep by Chinese decision makers in an international court, Japanese officials were able to establish sovereignty over the Ryukyus. Chinese and Japanese diplomats can both agree on these islands, however the Senkaku/Diaoyutai are not as easily reconciled. Chinese decision makers admit they accepted Japanese control of the Diaoyutai after the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.

⁵⁸ Duus, *Modern Japan*, 136.

Japanese leaders states Chinese perceptions are mistaken and that the Senkakus were not ceded in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japanese officials claim discovery of the islands in 1885, and after extensive surveys, claimed the islands as a sovereign Japanese territory in January 1895.⁵⁹ Consequently, the Senkaku were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands, which were ceded by the Ch'ing Court in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japanese diplomats add that all territories ceded in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Taiwan and Pescadores) were returned in the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty of 1952.⁶⁰

4. Summary of Japanese National Power and Conflict Management

Throughout this section on the Japanese government's quest to secure Japanese territorial borders and spheres of interest, scholars, leaders, and decision makers needed to resolve differences between its pre-western ideals of peace, harmony, and cooperation and western colonialism to "save face" from the recent humiliation of the unequal treaties. The late Tokugawa and early Meiji regimes emulated the colonial West as it attempted to match the carving up of Asia in hopes of being militarily, and economically equal to the great western powers of the age. This led to wars with both the governments of China and Russia over Japanese influence in Korea and Manchuria. In the 1930s, there was a split of nationalistic ideals as the government and military had different approaches to solve economic resource problems in Japan. An ultra-nationalistic movement shaped Japanese methods of dealing with the rest of Asia, specifically the influence of the western colonial powers. This ultra-nationalism is seen in Japanese decision makers' "go it alone" mentality in 1933 as it dropped out of the League of Nations and a military *coup d'etat* in 1936. A year after the coup, the *Kokutai no hongi* (Fundamentals of Our National Polity), was published and warped the traditional beliefs of harmony, inner peace, and *Bushido* into a "revolutionary nationalism" that captured the public.⁶¹ Out of self-interest, Japanese elites used concept of uniqueness and

⁵⁹ Mendl, Wolf, *Issues in Japan's China Policy*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978) 89. [herein cited: Mendl, *Issues in Japan's China Policy*].

⁶⁰ Treaty of Peace between Japan and Nationalist China, Taipei, 28 April 1952 as appeared in Wolf Mendl's, *Issues in Japan's China Policy*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), Appendix A, 134.

⁶¹ Tsunoda, de Barry, and Keene, *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, 785-795.

superiority as a means to free the rest of Asia of its western bonds so that Asia could once again be for Asians (under Japanese rule) during World War II. This became known as the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in which Japanese leaders sought to free Asia of western colonialism, which threatened Japanese hegemonism and influence over the area. Ultimately, Japanese leaders lost their desire for peaceful harmony in a quest to expand outward and to continue to maintain its sense of Japanese destiny - the formation of a Greater Asian Co-prosperity sphere to liberate Asia for Asians.

B. COLD WAR TERRITORIAL DISCOURSE IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TERMS

The establishment of the Cold War divided the world into three camps—the free world, the communist world, and the third world. The first two camps balanced one another through conflicts in under-developed and developing nations. Japanese territorial issues took a back seat, for the most part, in order for the U.S. to ensure an ideological victory over communism.

1. Soviet-Japanese Relations and the Territorial Issue

After surrendering to the Allied powers on 15 August 1945, all of Japan's territories were occupied by Allied forces, as stipulated in the 26 July 1945 Potsdam Declaration. The U.S. military forces occupied the main four main islands of Japan (Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku), as well as the Ryukyu Islands, to include Okinawa and Senkaku, and the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese Nationalists took control of Formosa (Taiwan) and Manchuria; and, the military forces of the Soviet Union occupied Sakhalin and all the Kuriles, to include the four islands acknowledged in the Shimoda Treaty of 1855, as well as the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. On 2 February 1946, the USSR incorporated the occupied territories into their territory through a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and expelled the indigenous Japanese while relocating Russians into the area.⁶²

The Cairo Declaration of 27 November 1943 established the framework and ground rules of the San Francisco Peace Treaty from which the three great allies (U.S.,

⁶² MOFA, *Japan's Northern Territories*.

U.K., and China) would occupy Japan and its territories at the war's end.⁶³ Of particular note is the policy of no territorial gain of the signatories. Consequently, there was an agreement that the return of territory would reflect a pre-Sino-Japanese War (1895) Asian landscape to include the return of Manchuria, Formosa, the Pescadores, and "all those territories which [Japan] has taken by violence and greed."⁶⁴

The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty was not signed by the Soviet Union. The main sticking point was the definition of the Kurile Islands. The common line of thought was that the Kuriles that Japanese leadership gave up in the treaty did not refer to the four that the 1855 Russo-Japanese Friendship Treaty clearly gave Japan. The truth is that Japanese officials understood that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (the two larger northern islands) were a part of the Kuriles to be given back as presented to the Diet on 19 October 1951, by the Foreign Ministry's Treaties Bureau head.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not want to compromise and the treaty remained unsigned.

To end the war with one another officially, the Soviet Union and Japan tried to negotiate a separate peace treaty from June 1955 to October 1956. This time, the 1956 San Francisco Peace Treaty addressed the two-island compromise, which was in line with what the Japanese expected in 1951.⁶⁶ This compromise was offered by the Soviet Union, but American officials suggested that if Japanese decision makers yielded in this situation, the U.S. would consider keeping the Ryukyu Islands.⁶⁷ Changes within

⁶³ Since the USSR had signed a neutrality pact with Japan and were concerned with German advances, they were not a part of the Cairo Declaration however, they acknowledged the when signing Potsdam Proclamation.

⁶⁴ United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, pg. 393, *Cairo Declaration*, www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/cairo-cnf.html, 27 May 01.

⁶⁵ Clark, Gregory, "The Long View on the Kuriles: Mori Recognizes that the Facts Demand Compromise," *The Japan Times*, 24 Mar 01, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20010324gc.htm>, 27 May 01. [herein cited: Clark, "The Long View on the Kuriles: Mori Recognizes that the Facts Demand Compromise"]

⁶⁶ Russia would grant Japan sovereignty of Shikotan and Habomai, while the USSR would maintain control of Etorofu, and Kunashiri.

⁶⁷ Clark, "The Long View on the Kuriles: Mori Recognizes that the Facts Demand Compromise".

Japanese politics forced an all or none approach from Tokyo.⁶⁸ Japanese diplomats refused to sign the treaty, but a joint Japan-Soviet Declaration was signed that ended the state of war and opened official diplomatic relations. The Declaration continues to stipulate that the USSR (and now Russia) will return Shikotan and Habomai to Japanese control upon the successful signing of a treaty. Efforts by Japanese diplomats to address the other two islands with the Soviets after 1956 met with a strict Soviet boilerplate response of refusing to negotiate sovereign Soviet territory. This could be attributed to the competing territorial issues the Soviet Union had with China and the former Soviet republics; hence the Northern Territories dilemma. If Soviet leaders made concessions with Japanese officials on the Northern Territories, then other nations may attempt to do the same. Additionally, there were, and are, some factions in Japan that would have the government claim all the Kuriles and half of Sakhalin in accordance with treaties signed in 1855 and 1875.⁶⁹ Consequently, the Soviet Union, and now Russia, fears a concession on four islands may open the door to future Japanese concessions on the remaining territory.

The Cold War relationship between the Soviet and Japanese leaders was characterized as *seikei fukabun* (“the inseparability of politics from economics”).⁷⁰ In the 1960s, Japanese policy makers tried to shift nationalistic tendencies away from the U.S. occupation in the Ryukyu Islands toward the Northern Territories and the USSR. The subsequent national outcry allowed Japanese diplomats to offer developmental aid to Moscow in return for a discourse on the Northern Territories. This did bring Moscow to the table, but Moscow refused to discuss the issue for fear of opening up the Soviet frontier to dispute.⁷¹ In 1977, fishing disputes involving Northern Territory and territorial

⁶⁸ Reischauer, Edwin O., and Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995) 419. [herein cited: Reischauer, and Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*].

⁶⁹ The Japanese Communist Party view can be located at www.jcp.or.jp/english/jps_weekly/Japan-Russia_Territorial_Q.html.

⁷⁰ Yasutomo, Dennis T., *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) 154. [herein cited: Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*].

⁷¹ Reischauer, and Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, 365.

water issues continued to keep the dispute in the forefront of the Japanese national debate.⁷² Japanese officials continued to link the development of closer economic ties to progress in resolving the territorial problem.⁷³ Unfortunately, Soviet-Japanese relations were hobbled by Japanese adherence to the principle of the inseparability of political and economic issues that characterized Soviet-Japanese Cold War bilateral relations. (It must be noted, however, that this was the exception to the rule for Japanese policy makers, who embraced the *sei kei bunri* policy of “separation of economics and politics.”) Though clinging to a rigid large-scale aid package until the Kurile dispute was settled, Japanese diplomats had offered humanitarian aid after Gorbachev agreed to speak about the Northern Territories in bilateral talks.⁷⁴

2. ROK-Japanese Relations and the Territorial Issue

Based on post-World War II documents, Tokdo was not to remain Japanese territory and US occupation forces ensured Japanese anglers could no longer fish within 12 nm of Tokdo.⁷⁵ The Japanese government has made, and continues to make, regular protestations of the Peace Line outlined in Syngman Rhee’s 1952 Presidential Declaration on Sovereignty of the Adjacent Seas.⁷⁶ Even after the 1965 normalization between the governments of South Korea and Japan, nationalism on both sides left the Tokdo/Takeshima issue unresolved.⁷⁷ This can be attributed to the need by both countries to shelve this contentious issue to reap the benefits of diplomatic and economic relations. In 1981, there was an official ROK protest after Japanese patrol boats docked at the islands. In 1983, Japanese officials were equally upset after ROK fishermen docked at

⁷² Mendl, *Issues in Japan’s China Policy*, 91-92.

⁷³ Aoki, Suzo, “An Uptick in Relations with Russia,” *Japan Echo*, Vol. 24, No. 5, December 1997, www.japanecho.com/docs/html/240507.html, 22 May 01. [herein cited Aoki, “An Uptick in Relations with Russia”]

⁷⁴ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy*, 152.

⁷⁵ Korean Educational Development Institute, *Facts and Fallacies about Korea*, 118 - 119.

⁷⁶ Han, Kay Lee, “Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokto in History and International Law,” *Korea Observer*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, Spring 1998, 2.

⁷⁷ Cha, Victor D., *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) 158. [herein cited: Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*].

the islands.⁷⁸ The Republic of Korea continues to bolster its position by inhabiting the islands. Seoul is considering the placement of improved pier facilities, electricity plants, water generators, and land reclamation projects for inhabitants.

Neither Tokyo nor Seoul discusses the disputed territories when relations are cordial.⁷⁹ Unfortunately, Japanese and South Korean nationalistic groups tend to keep ties strained. This is especially true when one country is in need of the other. Such was the case during the Cold War. Since the governments of Japan and South Korea were both on the “same side” in an U.S. versus USSR bipolar world, Japanese policy makers were forced to subordinate their views in the larger context of American foreign policy goals.

In an attempt to ensure an enhanced anti-Soviet security posture in Northeast Asia, President Reagan met with President Chun Doo Hwan and Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō in the spring of 1981. The result was the implication of a greater Japanese role in the region. This expanded upon the legacy of the Nixon-Sato Summit, which noted Japan’s stake in Northeast Asian stability. This expanded role of Japan’s greater defense came in the form of loans to assist the South Korean government in improving its security measures. Though a \$6 billion loan was originally agreed upon by Presidents Reagan and Chun, the Japanese said it would provide only \$1 billion in loans over five years.⁸⁰ Suzuki mentioned Takeshima and Korea’s desires not to discuss the territorial issue as reasons for not working with Korea on the loan for the original amount. The rest of the Cold War was marked by concerted efforts of both governments to increase both diplomatic and economic ties despite their continued dispute fueled by strong nationalistic tendencies.

3. Sino-Japanese Relations and the Territorial Issue

The issue of sovereignty was never big until Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of China began competing for economic resources. The area

⁷⁸ Ibid., 192.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 192.

⁸⁰ Lee, Chong-Sik, *Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press, 1985) 119.

surrounding the islands is rich in resources. In 1968, an Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported oil deposits in the area between Taiwan and Japan in which the Senkaku Islands fall.⁸¹ While there is still unsubstantiated speculation concerning hydrocarbon deposits, there are fisheries and plants that have medicinal value.

Japanese officials further the defense of their claim by pointing to American control of the islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands. When U.S. officials gave back Okinawa to Japan, it also gave back the Senkaku Islands. However, when Japanese diplomats turned to U.S. leaders for support in September 1970, the State Department stated that it would take a neutral stance and encouraged the involved parties to settle the dispute among themselves.⁸² During Congressional debates on the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, it was stated, “transferring its [U.S.] rights of administration to Japan does not specifically constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty nor can it affect the underlying claims of any of the disputants.”⁸³ This coincided with President Nixon’s announcement of plans to visit China.

With American policy shifting toward Chinese rapprochement, Japanese decision makers preferred a multilateral approach to exploiting the resources. Japanese officials attempted joint exploration with Chinese diplomats. The diplomats, however, would not discuss the issue until after its sovereignty was assured. The governments of China and Japan consequently agreed to sidestep the Senkaku issue in the 1970s to improve and normalize their relations.⁸⁴ Japanese officials were able to convince the governments of Taiwan and South Korea to pursue joint oil exploration while the PRC stood in the

⁸¹ Mendl, *Issues in Japan’s China Policy*, 88.

⁸² Ibid., 89-90.

⁸³ United States Congressional Record, 9 November 1971, Proceedings and debates of the 92nd Congress, First Session.

⁸⁴ Jain, Rajendra Kumar, *China and Japan, 1949 – 1976*, (New Delhi, India: Mechanical Tysetters & Printers Pvt. Ltd., 1977), 106-107. [herein cited: Jain, *China and Japan, 1949 – 1976*].

wings.⁸⁵ This joint exploration quickly stopped after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974.⁸⁶

After a May 1978 demonstration of over 100 Chinese fishing boats sailing around the islands, Deng Xiaoping suggested in a press conference that the issue would be handled better by the next generation.⁸⁷ Taipei and Beijing are joined on this issue. Since that time, however, there have been several confrontations including: oil concessions made by Taiwan (Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force turned the survey ships back); planting of an ROC flag (Japanese officials arrested and deported the transgressors); placing a Japanese lighthouse on an island (there were anti-Japanese movements in Hong Kong and China alike); and the 1997 attempted removal of said lighthouse which resulted in a sunken Hong Kong vessel as it attempted to cross the 12 mile territorial boundary.⁸⁸ The Japanese claim the ship was scuttled, while the Chinese argue that one of the 60 Japanese patrol boats rammed the Hong Kong vessel.

While groups on both sides try to inflame the issue, the three capitals involved, Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo seem to downplay the incidents and continue favorable diplomatic and trade policies. However, even though these governments wish to "shelve" the issue for a much later date, nationalistic populaces attempt to embarrass the ruling parties and factions into some sort of action.⁸⁹ The Japanese ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) further complicated the situation and supported the Chinese sovereignty principle because these islands lay on the Asian continental shelf of which Japan is not a part. Japan's Foreign Minister had stated, "Is this an issue we really need to discuss with China and Taiwan?"⁹⁰ The Japanese Foreign

⁸⁵ Mendl, *Issues in Japan's China Policy*, 91.

⁸⁶ Jain, *China and Japan, 1949 – 1976*, 130.

⁸⁷ Whiting, Allen S., *China Eyes Japan*, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1989) 68-69.

⁸⁸ Roy, Denny, *China's Foreign Relations*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998) 168 - 169. [herein cited: Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*].

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁹⁰ Ueno, Teruaki, "Japan Enters Renewed Territorial Row with China," *Reuters*, 18 Jul 96.

Ministry issued the following, which characterizes the true feelings of Japanese leaders on the dispute,

...the government of Japan has made public that the Islands are an integral part of Japan. However, it does not necessarily mean that the Japanese side wants to have the bilateral relationship jeopardized by this matter. On the contrary, although the government of China has a different attitude, we would like to strengthen our bilateral relationship, and we would hope that this [would] be the case in the future.⁹¹

Surprisingly, Sino-Japanese relations, though seemingly on opposite sides of the Cold War fence, actually got better in spite of the Cold War environment. Chinese rapprochement, in July 1972, brought promises of dropping the Senkaku territorial issue.⁹² While the government of Japan still possesses the territories, it was in no real hurry to confront Chinese leadership on the issue considering that Japanese businesses were interested in investing in the untapped economic markets of the People's Republic of China. There was no need to quibble over a few rocks that the U.S. government just reverted to Japanese control, in a time of such economic potential. In August 1973, during the 10th Party Congress, Chou En-lai sided with Japanese diplomats against the USSR on the Northern Territories issue; however, this public support did not assist the Japanese government in its relations with the USSR. As noted in a July 1976 Diet speech, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa stated Beijing's support constituted interference in internal matters.⁹³

It is interesting to note, however, that the Chinese benefited from the territorial row Japanese officials had with the USSR. Refusing to comply with G-7 initiatives to prop up the failing Soviet government, in July 1989, at the Paris G-7 Summit, Japanese policy makers called for a relaxing of economic sanctions against China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in June.⁹⁴ Less than a year later, in the spring of 1990, Japanese and American diplomats agreed to endorse Russian aid in exchange for Chinese

⁹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 10 September 1996* [translated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs], <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1996/9/910.html>, 27 May 01. [herein cited MOFA, *Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 10 September 1996*]

⁹² Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, 105.

⁹³ Jain, *China and Japan, 1949 – 1976*, 133.

⁹⁴ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, 153.

aid.⁹⁵ This aid at the expense of the Soviet Union and Russia will be explained in detail later in the thesis.

It is here that the Japanese government is preparing itself for a new role in the international community, separate from that of the United States. The end of the Cold War brought Japanese leaders to the realization that “narrow national interests required adjustment to an emerging world order.”⁹⁶ Hence, the use of multinational developmental banks (MDBs) and similar non-governmental organizations (NGOs) became the instruments needed to resolve policy issues.

4. Summary of Cold War Japanese Conflict Management

Being very self-conscious of the atrocities committed prior to 1945 in the name of Japanese nationalism and prosperity, Japanese policy makers developed a foreign policy known as Comprehensive Security. This was a three-tiered policy of arms control, improved cooperation, and coordination with the leading powers of the world, and improving Japanese internal military structure and technology. Though very straightforward from a western sense, this “comprehensive” security is quite nuanced and reflects ideals similar to earlier traditional definitions of “security” in terms of survivability of what it is to be Japanese. This nationalistic trend of assisting other Asian nations was reflected in generous official developmental assistance (ODA) Japanese policy makers allocate to the region. Japanese leaders still seek to lead Asia into a better position in the world but through interdependence rather than military might. Though having a modern facade, this comprehensive security is similar to the Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere of the early twentieth century. In this venture, however, Japanese policy makers ensured that the military would not be the only option for meeting its objectives. Japanese foreign policy is comprised of not only military minds, but those of economics, cultural, trade, and other non-military areas to ensure weighty decisions are made after all avenues have been addressed and considered.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 153.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 153.

C. POST-COLD WAR TERRITORIAL DISCOURSE IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TERMS

With the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government found itself pressured into accepting a larger financial role in the world and established itself in the international arena. In so doing, Japanese leaders were able to separate its interests from the U.S. government in multinational forums like the G-7.⁹⁷ Therefore, Japanese officials were forced to exercise some of the soft power it established during the Cold War. This economic power-base was valuable in the bipolar conflict of the Cold War; Japanese leaders, similar to a victor in a “hot” war, explored the spoils of victory. This triumph was much to the chagrin of Russian leaders, and to a lesser extent the governments of China and South Korea. It will be demonstrated that while the Japanese government did not have the military muscle to drastically impact on its neighbors concerning the territorial disputes, Japanese policy makers had something much stronger – freedom to exercise its own foreign policy goals. This freedom was separate of those of the American foreign policy goals and literally came at the expense of its territorial competitors. Figure 2 graphically demonstrates the relationship of these disputed territories with Japan’s neighbors.

1. Recent Russo-Japanese Territorial Relations

Since the 1956 joint declaration, there have been warm and cold overtures by Moscow toward Tokyo on resolving the dispute. In general, there appeared to be a delay tactic employed by the Russians. There were complimentary and conflicting outside pressure (*gaiatsu*) concerning aid to Russia.⁹⁸ For Japanese officials, these included domestic issues, relations with western allies (specifically the U.S., but also its G-7 partners), fears of losing investments dollars from neighboring developing nations, and the desire to aid the emerging Central Asian Republics (CARs).⁹⁹ Japanese policy makers, realizing its economic influence, began to seek a niche from which to gain an

⁹⁷ Ibid., 166.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 176.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 189.




Figure 2. Japan's Territorial Disputes

(From: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/japan_pol96.jpg)

advantage for future Northern Territories discussions.¹⁰⁰ The Japanese Foreign Ministry clearly delineated its foreign policy goals with regard to the Northern Territories with the following statement: “Although Japan’s *attitude* has become more flexible, neither the Japanese government nor the LDP has abandoned the *substance* of their basic demand, which remains the return of the four islands.”¹⁰¹

In early 1992, the Japanese government was again pressed to give more aid to Russia. Foreign Minister Watanabe raised the possibility of providing aid if Japan would have sovereignty over all four islands, but allow Russia to administratively control the two northern islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.¹⁰² Yeltsin failed to respond. Consequently, Japanese diplomats used the G-7 to multilateralize its bilateral disagreements with Russia over the Northern Territories.¹⁰³ Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi stated, “The territorial dispute should be the common concern of the entire Group of Seven industrialized nations.”¹⁰⁴ Ultimately, however, Japan found itself alone on the Northern Territories issue and scheduled to hold the G-7 meeting in Tokyo later that year.

In April 1993, with all eyes on Japan (and with much coaxing from American diplomats), the Japanese government gave \$1.83 billion dollars (half of what the U.S. said Japan would give to Russia) as a part of a \$43 billion aid package.¹⁰⁵ Japanese leaders was able to “save face” in this reversal of policy by (1) controlling the flow of money through “closely coordinated consultation;”¹⁰⁶ (2) allowing the G-7 to be the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 175.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 172.

¹⁰² “Watanabe Offers New Islands Deal,” *Daily Yomiuri*, 19 April 1992.

¹⁰³ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy*, 159, 165.

¹⁰⁴ Masayuki, Mizuno, “Kohl, Mitterrand Reassure Miyazawa on Island Disputes, CIS Aid Issue,” *Daily Yomiuri*, 1 May 1992.

¹⁰⁵ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy*, 159-160.

¹⁰⁶ Koseki, Mari, and Ako Wassho, “Tokyo Treads Fine Line in Russia Aid Talks,” *Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, Vol. 33, No. 16, 15-25 April 1993.

leader to ensure this control; and (3) requiring that the aid be used to assist the Russian people in self-help programs that were “pragmatic, visible, and tangible.”¹⁰⁷

Knowing Russia seemed to be generous in its discussion of the disputed Kuriles while looking for Japanese aid, Tokyo was able to parlay the Tokyo Summit into a cornerstone of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations. The Tokyo Declaration was signed during the visit of President Boris Yeltsin of Russia to Japan in October 1993. Prime Minister Hashimoto presented to President Yeltsin a proposal toward a resolution of the territorial issue. Both leaders agreed that the peace treaty should contain a solution to the issue of the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles, and incorporate the principles governing Russo-Japanese friendship and cooperation, as they move into the twenty-first century (the Kawana Agreement). In the economic sector, leaders agreed to consider working together to establish a Russo-Japanese investment company to promote investment in Russia, and agreed to continue to steadily implement and expand the Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan.¹⁰⁸

Unwillingness to give Russians aid goes beyond the Northern Territories, however, as Japanese nationalism guides anti-Russian sentiment. An insulting and cruel history continually reminds the Japanese of its past dealings with the USSR – including its belated entry into World War II, Japanese POWs, fishery negotiations, competing territory claims, downing of Korean Air 007, airspace violations, dumping nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan, and intelligence activities in Japan.¹⁰⁹

After the collapse of the USSR, the Japanese government slightly increased its aid to Russia, but still only multilaterally. As long as the Northern Territories issue was unresolved, the aid Japanese policy makers granted would remain small, humanitarian, semiofficial, and of a multilateral nature.¹¹⁰ Additionally, mistrust was evident as

¹⁰⁷ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, 160.

¹⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999: Japan's Diplomacy with Leadership Toward the New Century*, <http://www.infojapan.org/policy/other/bluebook/1999/I-c.html>, 25 May 01. [herein cited: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*]

¹⁰⁹ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, 125 and 152.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 154.

Japanese leaders were weary of giving aid to Russia through the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) due to a “limitless need of financial aid”; however, the Northern Territories dispute did not make the situation any easier.¹¹¹ In the end, multinational development bank (MDB) policies won out over bilateral political relations.¹¹² MDB policies allowed Russia to get around these bilateral obstacles.

Japan’s economic strength was being undermined by MDBs, so Japan decision makers adopted a new policy of cooperation. This cooperative spirit was followed up by a new Russia policy outlined by then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in July 1997. The Prime Minister appeared to be aiming not to seek the middle ground between the Japanese and Russian positions but rather to encourage Russian leaders to decide in favor of the government of Japan’s position, offering cooperation in exchange for reform efforts. In the process, this would create a consensus that returning the islands to Japanese control would benefit both countries.¹¹³ This idea of joint gain over individual loss (in the form of forgone investment, aid, trade, and development), as well as poor diplomatic relations, was felt by all parties concerned. Such sentiment has led to confidence building measures regarding the Northern Territories. These include travel to the territories without visas, unrestricted trade across the border and mutually beneficial trade relations that hinder Russian black-markets of Japanese fish.

As a result of such cooperation, a framework agreement was signed in regard to the operation of Japanese fishing vessels in the waters around the four islands in the Northern Territories.¹¹⁴ During a presentation of a paper on Russo-Japanese relations, in February 2001, Dr. Tatsuo Arima closely associated poor political and economic ties and cooperation with Russia due to the inability of the governments to resolve the Northern

¹¹¹ Ibid., 112.

¹¹² Ibid., 114.

¹¹³ Aoki, Suzo, “An Uptick in Relations with Russia,” *Japan Echo*, Vol. 24, No. 5, December 1997, www.japanecho.com/docs/html/240507.html, 22 May 01.

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*.

Territories dispute.¹¹⁵ Dr. Arima concludes, "If the leaders of Japan and Russia can resolve the difficulty lying between us and normalize our bilateral relationship on the basis of a peace treaty, the ties between the two peoples will become dramatically stronger."¹¹⁶

Relations between the two have culminated in the 25 March 2001 signing of the Irkutsk Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation on the Continuation of Future Negotiations on the Issue of a Peace Treaty.¹¹⁷ It encapsulates all the other meetings as a means of working toward an end of the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles dispute. The redeeming quality of this document, from a Japanese standpoint, is the naming of all four islands being contested and the assurance to resolve the matter quickly. Unfortunately, similar words were used by Mikhail Gorbachev in a 1991 Japan-Soviet Communiqué. Nevertheless, after the cooling Yeltsin period, and chilly Putin start, this most recent statement has made the leaders in Japan feel warmer toward its chilly neighbor to the north. Former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori hailed the signing of the Irkutsk Declaration and said, "USSR secretaries did not necessarily acknowledge the 1956 Joint Declaration between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is a big step forward that Japan and Russia confirmed [the joint declaration] in a written form. [The Irkutsk Declaration] could be a great starting point for a peace treaty between the two countries."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Dr. Tatsuo Arima was the government of Japan representative at the 37th Munich Security Council Meeting entitled "Bilateral Relations with Russia from Japan's Perspective" on February 2001. The purpose of this council is for governmental representatives to discuss international security issues.

¹¹⁶ Tatsuo, Arima, "Bilateral Relations with Russia from Japan's Perspective," at the 37th Munich Security Council Meeting <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/speech0102.html>, 27 May 01.

¹¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Irkutsk Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation on the Continuation of Future Negotiations on the Issue of a Peace Treaty*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/pmv0103/state.html>, 27 May 01.

¹¹⁸ Yomiuri Shimbun, "Mori Says that Confirmation of Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration was Big Achievement," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 26 March 01, [translation by The Nautilus Institute, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0104/apr02.html>, 25 May 01].

2. Recent ROK-Japanese Territorial Relations

Unfortunately, for the governments of Japan and South Korea, historical and political conflicts continually hinder economic cooperation.¹¹⁹ Textbooks and other issues continually remind the nationalists on both side of the sea to keep the territorial issue close to the national consciousness. Consequently, nationalism, on both sides, fuels this territorial debate.¹²⁰ Unfortunately, Koreans seem to perceive their own government as too timid so as not to affect existing economic and diplomatic relations with the Japanese government.¹²¹ One thing is for certain, Korean political parties and factions can all unite on the Tokto issue. Ultimately, decisions are not made by the public and Korean policy makers have had to make some concessions on the Tokto issue for economic growth. One of these concessions includes an ocean development plan called the "Ocean and Fishery Vision for the 21st Century."¹²² A Japanese Foreign Ministry's statement on the 1997 fisheries agreement sums up both country's desires concerning the dispute, "We would like to make positive efforts to conclude a new fisheries agreement as soon as possible in the context of our efforts to strengthen the overall relationship between the two countries." However, added, "... the new bilateral agreement between the two countries must be in keeping with the objectives of [UNCLOS]."¹²³ Japanese officials has consistently held the position that, in light of the historical facts, as well as the rules and principles of international law, Takeshima is an integral part of Japan, and

¹¹⁹ Yoo, Jin-seok, "New Era Dawns in Economic Cooperation Between Korea, China and Japan," The Korea Herald [English Update], 13 Dec 99, www.koreaherald.co.ke/SITE/data/html_dir/1999/12/13/199912130027.asp, 22 May 01.

¹²⁰ Soeya, Yoshihide, "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998) 207. [herein cited: Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives"].; and, Moffet, Sebastian, Shim Jae Hoon, and Matt Forney, "Oceans Apart," *Far East Economic Review*, Vol. 159, No. 10, 7 Mar 96, 16.

¹²¹ Korea Herald, "Lawmakers Call for Parliament to Take Lead on Tokdo Dominion Issue," The Korea Herald [English Update], 15 Jul 00, www.koreaherald.co.ke/SITE/data/html_dir/2000/07/15/200007150005.asp, 22 May 01.

¹²² The Ocean and Fishery Department of the Republic of Korea, May 1997.

¹²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Press Conference by the Press Secretary, April 24, 1998*, [translated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs], <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/4/424.html>, 27 May 01.

will take a course of continued and persistent dialogue with the ROK on this issue.¹²⁴ However, in recent Trilateral Coordination Organization Group talks, neither side has brought up the subject, but rather focused on what could be done about the North Korean situation.

This does not sit well with Korean nationalists. Seoul views subtle infringements by the Japanese as a means of solidifying its claim over Tokdo through expansion. These infringements include Japanese citizens claiming residency on Takeshima in census records, defense force exercises near the islands, and joint fishery arrangements.¹²⁵ However, after a Korean citizen claimed a fisheries agreement “trespassed” against Korean fishermen’s rights of sovereignty, Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that a 1999 Korea-Japan Fishery Agreement¹²⁶ does not relate to the territorial dispute of Tokdo.¹²⁷ This court ruling, however, will not remove the nationalistic rigor on either side of the debate.

3. Recent Sino-Japanese Territorial Relations

During the Cold War, the Chinese benefited from the rift between the Soviets and Japanese. Despite the Senkaku dispute, Japanese policy makers still provided economic assistance and advised the international community against isolating China.¹²⁸ This came in the form of generous aid and the Japanese use of multinational development banks (MDBs) to benefit the Chinese regime. These Sino-Japanese relations were evident in 1978 when the governments of the PRC and Japan agreed to shelve the territorial dispute issue “until the next century” during a signing of the peace and friendship treaty.

¹²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*.

¹²⁵ Korean Herald, “Renewed Tokto Dispute,” *The Korea Herald* [English Update], 30 Dec 00, www.koreaherald.co.ke/SITE/data/html_dir/1999/12/30/199912300017.asp, 22 May 01.

¹²⁶ This agreement: 1) designates the boundary of the continental shelf (provisional fisheries line); 2) licensing and policing of vessels through joint consultation; and 3) catch quota would be equal after 3 years. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*.)

¹²⁷ The Korea Herald, “Korea-Japan Fishery Accord Is Not Related to Control over Tokdo,” *The Korea Herald* [English Update], 23 Mar 01, www.koreaherald.co.ke/SITE/data/html_dir/2001/03/23/200103230055.asp, 22 May 01.

¹²⁸ Bessho, Koro, *Adelphi Paper 325: Identities and Security in East Asia*, New York, NY: Oxford University press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999) 33. [herein cited: Bessho, *Adelphi Paper 325: Identities and Security in East Asia*]

However, these good times seemed to take a turn for the worse. In 1992, Chinese policy makers issued its territorial law proclamation that claimed the Senkaku Islands and islands in the South China Sea as reclaimed Chinese territory taken during its century of humiliation.¹²⁹ This proclamation notwithstanding, Japanese officials still pushed for developmental aid to China rather than Russia.¹³⁰ This can be attributed to several factors. The first is a close Asian bond to China. While the Japanese has gone to great lengths to differentiate Japan from China, there is still the knowledge that Japan and China have a shared history. Additionally, the government of Japan possesses the Senkaku, and is in control, whereas Russia controls the Northern Territories, which Japanese leaders are trying to recapture.

These ties, however, do come under stress when domestic politics influence Japanese foreign policy, especially in the later half of the 1990s. After ratifying UNCLOS, the Japanese government came under pressure to establish formally a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around all of Japanese territory. This has created tension between the governments of China, Japan, and South Korea. In response, Chinese officials sent oil-drilling vessels near the Senkaku Islands to reassert its claims to the territory.¹³¹ Additionally, as Beijing conducted some nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996, Tokyo was prompted to suspend a portion of its official developmental assistance (ODA) to China. From the Chinese perspective, Japanese ODA was seen as war reparations under a different name.¹³² Chinese missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 further riled Tokyo, and generated increasing sympathy for the democratic - and openly pro-Japanese - government of President Lee Teng-hui.¹³³

¹²⁹ Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives," 204.

¹³⁰ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, 166.

¹³¹ Schweller, Randall L., "Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Robert S. Ross (ed.), *Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 15. [herein cited Schweller, "Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory"]

¹³² Johnstone, Christopher B., "Paradigms Lost: Japan's Asia Policy in a Time of Growing Chinese Power," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 3, December 1999, 377. [herein cited: Johnstone, "Paradigms Lost: Japan's Asia Policy in a Time of Growing Chinese Power"].

¹³³ Ibid., 377.

Tokyo, however, is secure in the knowledge that the U.S.-Japan Treaty makes provisions for the defense of those islands.¹³⁴ In 1996, the reemergence of the dispute over the lighthouse of the conflicted islands further rocked bilateral ties. Tensions rose in 1996 over Senkaku sovereignty issues in Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, Tokyo and Beijing down played the situation to prevent a rift in their relations. "... [Japanese] policy makers still appear overwhelmingly to believe that supporting Beijing's reform process is crucial if the country [China] is to become a responsible power."¹³⁵

Along these lines, in August 1996, a Sino-Japanese fishing agreement concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyutai seemed to have quelled the troubled waters.¹³⁶ The following statement was made by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, "We sincerely hope that both the people of Japan and the People's Republic of China deal with the Senkaku Islands issues calmly, so that it will not affect the friendly relationship between Japan and China, which the government of Japan regards as highly important."¹³⁷ Japanese leaders would rather favor joint development and sovereignty, than have modernized Chinese naval forces to threaten the region further.¹³⁸

In summary, the Chinese national sensitivity to sovereignty issues tends to drive Chinese politics and compel Chinese officials to take an active stance on the territorial claims.¹³⁹ As such, Chinese decision makers dispatched drilling vessels to the waters surrounding Senkaku, and sided with the South Korean position on the Takeshima dispute. The intent was to demonstrate to the Japanese the effects their territorial claims will have on Sino-Japanese relations. The Chinese government seems content with the existing relationship rather than push potentially damaging issues to a head. Similarly,

¹³⁴ Lee, Lai To, *China and the South China Sea Dialogues*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999) 144-145.

¹³⁵ Bessho, *Adelphi Paper 325: Identities and Security in East Asia*, 34.

¹³⁶ MOFA, *Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 10 September 1996*.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Green, Michael Jonathan, "Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan", in Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999) 169.

¹³⁹ Schweller, "Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," 19.

Japanese leaders do not want the territorial dispute to hinder Sino-Japanese relations; however, they will not cede its interests in the Senkaku Islands either. The Japanese *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999* offers the following summary of its position on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute:

...with regard to the issue of recognition of past history, [China and Japan] affirmed in the Japan-China Joint Declaration that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history were the important foundations for further developing relations between Japan and China, and that it would be important to firmly maintain this basic stance. With regard to the Senkaku Islands issue, Japan will continue to deal with this matter in line with Japan's basic position that the Senkaku Islands are an integral part of Japanese territory and that Japan has effective control over them. The central tasks facing the peoples of both Japan and China will be to steadily address these various causes of concern between Japan and China, further deepening mutual understanding through the expansion of exchange at various levels, the younger generation included, also working together on the various challenges facing the international community.¹⁴⁰

4. Summary of Post-Cold War Japanese Conflict Management

Japanese decision makers has long believed that conflict prevention should be addressed through a comprehensive approach and has taken every opportunity to appeal to the international community on these grounds. Such an approach entails developing an overall grasp of the various causes behind the outbreak of a conflict (keeping in mind efforts from pre-conflict through post-conflict stages), as well as including political, security, economic, social, and development areas. The need for such an approach having been confirmed at the ad-hoc G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on conflict prevention held in Berlin in December 1999, the international community is gradually coming to recognize the importance of a comprehensive approach. The Japanese government for its part will continue to promote this comprehensive approach in settling its territorial disputes with its neighbors. This leads into the next issues of relevance concerning Japanese conflict management – the impact of this method of conflict management in the government's foreign policy.

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*.

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IV. THE IMPACT OF JAPAN'S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STYLE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

In 1947, the Japanese Diet signed the United States written Japanese Constitution. It has become known as the “peace constitution” because it reflects Japanese desire for peace and integration into the international system and renunciation of war as means for achieving its national interests. Consequently, Japanese decision makers have sought other than military means of achieving its national interests as reflected previously in this thesis. Given Japanese inclinations toward a conflict management theory, a series of expectations can be devised concerning Japanese foreign policy. As has been seen in the territorial disputes, Japanese foreign policy has tended toward bilateral economic relationships rather than complex multilateral inter-relationships, thus favoring simple frameworks from which to address international issues.¹⁴¹

During the Cold War, the government of Japan's policies were primarily to enrich its economic influence while marching in-step with United States policy interests. This began to change in the post-Cold War era and Japanese policy makers have been able to step out of the foreign policy shadow of the United States. Though still counting on U.S. military protection and external security, Japanese decision makers have been able to exercise its own foreign policy interests. Strengthening the existing U.S.-Japanese security framework has allowed Japanese leaders to feel secure in exploring multilateral regimes such as economic alliances and even peacekeeping operations. To address this topic clearly, there will be an examination of the existing security dilemma, followed by an exploration of Japanese foreign policy in relation to the United States, the region, and the world.

A. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

Over an eight year formative period in Japan's post World War II (1946-1954) history, Yoshida Shigeru, post war Japan's second and fifth Prime Minister and at times concurrent Foreign Minister, concentrated on economic recovery while avoiding security related international affairs. This unofficial foreign policy position has been called the

¹⁴¹ Japanese Forum on International Relations, *Japan's Initiatives Towards U.S., China, and Russia*, www.jfir.or.jp/e-jf-pr-18/pr18-summary.html, 29 Aug 01.

Yoshida Doctrine and maintained a neo-mercantilist hold on Japanese foreign policy until the mid-1980s. Though Yoshida denied any “national economy” views, in Kenneth Pyle’s book, *The Japanese Question*, he describes what he believes to be the three tenets on which the Yoshida Doctrine was based.¹⁴² First was the Japanese focus on economic rehabilitation and the United States was necessary in accomplishing this goal. Japanese policy makers’ strategy of economics first, while relying on a United States security guarantee, allowed Japanese leaders to avoid the domestic turmoil and controversy that an active foreign policy would have required and was able to focus on economic growth.¹⁴³ The second tenet entailed that the Japanese government should minimize its military force to mobilize its citizens for economic reconstruction. This had the additional benefit of allaying its neighbors’ fears as well as minimizing internal struggle over rearmament. Finally, to ensure its own physical security, Japanese officials would allow the U.S. Department of Defense to have military bases on its soil. These last two relieved Japanese decision makers of the traditional security dilemma other nations face. The idea of arming for defense without scaring your neighbors into an arms race is always a concern in this region. American policy makers ensured Japanese security while not inciting massive military build-ups within the region.

Soon after Yoshida left office, in 1956, the Japanese people had achieved the long cherished hope of UN membership. Additionally, the Japanese government had been selected to participate as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Consequently, the Diplomatic Bluebook of 1957 set forth the first three official principles of Japanese foreign policy: diplomacy centered on the United Nations, membership in the Asian community, and maintenance of cooperation with the free world.¹⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, these principles reinforced earlier notions of peace, harmony, and stability as seen before the Meiji Restoration. Finally, Japanese diplomats were able to establish

¹⁴² Pyle, Kenneth B., *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992), 107. [herein cited Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*]

¹⁴³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁴ Kitaoka, Shin’ichi, *Japan’s Identity and What It Means*, www.jfir.or.jp/e_research/seminar1/conver_3.htm, 29 Aug 01.

an international policy to which it was naturally accustomed and was not structured according to western precepts. These three ideals are what continue to shape the government of Japan's foreign policy even today although the structure of the world order has dramatically changed.

In the 1970s, the new Sino-U.S. détente, an emerging oil crisis, and the possible withdrawal of American strategic interest from the Pacific (a concern caused by the American reversion of Okinawa and loss in Vietnam) forced Japanese leaders to reevaluate its reliance upon the United States for its security needs and interests. Up until this time, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took a back seat to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). By the mid-1970s, Japanese policy makers began to take a more “omni-directional foreign policy” (*zenhōi gaikō*).¹⁴⁵ This comprehensive security (*sōgō anzen*) policy of cordial relations, economic aid, and political discourse, was used to satisfy emerging international interests not being met through the existing U.S.-Japanese arrangement.

Still though, this over-lapping of domestic and international affairs was more passive than pacifist in nature.¹⁴⁶ It has been referred to both domestically and internationally as “an extremely defensive defense” (*senshu bōei*).¹⁴⁷ Michael Blaker describes this behavior as “coping” or “carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about the situation faced, and then performing the minimum adjustments needed to neutralize or overcome criticism and adapt to the existing situation with the fewest risks.”¹⁴⁸ This cautious attitude has been changing to be a bit more forward-

¹⁴⁵ Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, 35.

¹⁴⁶ Daadler, Ivo H., *Prospects for Global Leadership Sharing: The Security Dimension*, (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1996), 29. [herein cited Daadler, *Prospects for Global Leadership Sharing: The Security Dimension*]

¹⁴⁷ Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, 35.

¹⁴⁸ Blaker, Michael, “Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance,” in Gerald L. Curtis, (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change*, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 1993), 23.

looking as is evident in the Japanese Defense Agency's 1996 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).

The 1996 NDPO dictated that the government of Japan should possess the minimum level of basic defense capability as an independent nation so as not to create an unstable factor in the region. Specifically, Japanese decision makers should make its defense capability more efficient and compact. This entailed a reduction in the number of Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel by about 10% to 20% (the number varies depending on each unit's equipment and personnel). However, the outline emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements more than the 1976 NDPO and it specified several measures for improving the relationship. Additionally, it stated that while the principal mission of the SDF continued to be the defense of Japan, the SDF would also have to be prepared for various situations, such as large-scale disasters, and to play an appropriate role in the government's efforts to establish a more stable security environment.

Japanese foreign policy has been moving from "just coping" to being more proactive. The Clinton administration made Japanese officials further evaluate its relationship with the United States. As will be seen in the next section, the U.S.-Japanese Security Agreement was revised such that the Japanese government was forced to take a more active role in its own defense and in maintaining stability within the region. While this call for a more militarized Japan met resistance by both Japanese and the region, the election of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on 24 April 2001 has demonstrated that the Japanese people may be willing to consider a larger role for the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF). This role has been accelerated given the international war on terrorism following the terrorist action on 11 September 2001.

Before the war on terrorism, however, the Japanese Defense Agency issued its Defense White Paper in July 2001. In the first part, it stated that the military modernization of the PLA exceeds the forces necessary for defense and is a threat to stability in the region.¹⁴⁹ It argued against the relevant articles in the "Peace

¹⁴⁹ Zhu Xiao, "Japan Wishes to Speed Up Its Military Expansion," *Global Times*, 10 July 01, [excerpts translated by The Nautilus Institute, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0104/july10.html>, 25 May 01], 10 July 01

Constitution," and stated that since Japan is a country with independent sovereignty, it ought to have the right of self-defense. It not only proposed that the government of Japan had the right to its own military forces, but also requested to expand weapons systems and strengthen the capability of dispatching military forces. To enable the JSDF to react quickly in emergent situations, it said that Japanese leaders should improve the JSDF's modernization of equipment as well as carry out a revision of relevant regulations that restrict the JSDF's action.

Another feature of the white paper is that it emphasized the importance of continuing cooperation with the United States, and carrying out joint research on the missile defense system, because Japan is facing a possible security threat. The American military and defense policies have been a "lynch-pin" for Japanese foreign, economic, and political relations and development. Consequently, an appraisal of the U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship is warranted.

B. EVOLUTION OF A PARTNERSHIP: THE U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY AGREEMENT

The post-World War II arrangement between United States government and the government of Japan has been characterized as a symbiotic relationship of "materiel for manpower."¹⁵⁰ This relationship began after the occupation under the watchful eye of Yoshida, who was advancing his own plans for Japanese internationalization. In 1960, a security treaty was completed that supported Japanese officials playing an active role on the world stage as an economics-oriented nation. The United States government went so far as to give Japan the opportunity to be a full member in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Additionally, Japanese leaders were able to work with such international economic organizations as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Prime Minister Ikeda identified Japan as one of the "three pillars" of the free world, with the U.S., Europe, and Japan responsible for maintaining an open and free economic order that radiated like a fan from the United States and this new treaty was similar in character to a

¹⁵⁰ Iokibe, Makoto, *The Japan-U.S. Alliance As A Maritime Alliance*, www.jfir.or.jp/e_research/seminar2/conver_2.htm, 29 Aug 01.

maritime alliance.¹⁵¹ This demonstrated Japanese perception of its importance in the existing international system.

In the 1970s, the Japanese government needed only a limited military capability within the international cooperative framework of the U.S.-Japan guidelines. International acceptance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance grew during this period. Chinese leaders took a more flexible attitude towards the U.S.-Japan security alliance in light of its own anti-Soviet and anti-hegemony stance. Additionally, the Mao government agreed with Nixon and Kissinger that the U.S.-Japan alliance helped keep the "cork in the bottle" in preventing Japan from becoming an independent military power.¹⁵²

Through host nation support (HNS) and use of land, Japanese leaders had secured an American presence on the islands. This has numerous implications for both the governments of Japan and the United States. The security agreement ensured the United States' commitment to the area. This commitment provided a certain amount of stability to the region and could ward off potential disputes (i.e.: territorial disputes and the Korean Peninsula). While this may satisfy joint U.S.-Japanese interests, their bilateral relationship also allowed the Japanese government to assume a certain amount of its own international standing and prestige.¹⁵³ The U.S.-Japanese alliance had given the government of Japan international creditability without fear of Japanese independence of action.¹⁵⁴

This has not been lost on some American policy makers who have seen Japanese officials as advancing their own policies without any of the risks. Japanese diplomats have depended on the United States government for defense matters and have used it as

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid

¹⁵³ Leitch, Richard D., Akira Kato, and Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 160. [herein cited Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*]

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 182.

an opportunity to meet its international interests through “economic rationalism.”¹⁵⁵ When Americans have called for reciprocity or burden sharing, Japanese leaders would talk about constitutional constraints, pacifism, the fear of its Asian neighbors, and the “specter of revived militarism.”¹⁵⁶ Due to such debate and after a series of regional threats (i.e.: the North Korean nuclear program and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis), the U.S.-Japan security alliance was re-visited. The New Defense Guidelines were established in 1997 and they redefined the roles of both the governments of the United States and Japan. Consequently, the United States would provide structure to the Asia-Pacific region and the world abroad through its military might. In return, U.S. leaders would give prior notification, if not consultation, to Japanese officials concerning U.S. troops in Japan for non-Japanese defense in providing security and stability to the region. The government of Japan is assuming some burden sharing in the form of greater HNS and logistical support. There is the additional agreement that there will be joint defense related technology development (i.e.: missile defense). Given this focus on regional stability, it would be relevant to look at how the Japanese government addresses its regional concerns.

C. JAPAN AND REGIONALISM

On 15 August 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a statement of apology that was approved by the Cabinet. He expressed “feelings of deep remorse” due to the “tremendous damage and suffering [Japan caused] to the people of many countries” “through its colonial rule and aggression” during the Great Pacific War.¹⁵⁷ Since the end of the Cold War, the government of Japan has become dialogue partners with its Asian neighbors which allows the Japanese to explain their policies and atone for its past.¹⁵⁸ It is through this

¹⁵⁵ Ito, Kenichi, “Introduction,” to *Japanese Forum on International Relations: Maritime Nation Seminar*, http://www.jfir.or.jp/e_research/seminar1/conver_1.htm, 29 Aug 01.

¹⁵⁶ Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, 121.

¹⁵⁷ Bessho, *Adelphi Paper 325: Identities and Security in East Asia*, 23.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

dialogue that Japanese diplomats may be able to bridge the gap between east and west through economic policies and greater leadership roles for the region in the world.

Japan has traditionally emphasized economic cooperation [in the region] from the perspective that economic development is most important for regional stability. For instance, top priority has been placed on the Asian region in Japan's programs. Such efforts have contributed greatly to the peace and prosperity of the region, and Japan will continue the endeavor. In addition to these efforts, what must be strengthened are the political and diplomatic endeavors on direct and indirect contributions toward solutions of regional conflicts and confrontations, such as the Cambodian problem or the Korean Peninsula problem. It is essential to play a positive role in multilateral cooperation and consultations in the region as symbolized in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and to support each country's efforts to democratize, open up the economy and transform it into a market economy. Amid the evolving world order, the international contribution expected of Japan is not confined merely to the economic arena but also increasingly includes the political dimensions as well. Japan, with the correct recognition of history,¹⁵⁹ will have to make positive contributions appropriate for a peace-loving nation.

The Japanese government's newly adopted post-Cold War foreign policy was stated in the 1991 *Diplomatic Bluebook*. It clearly reflects that there are connections between Japanese security and stability in the region and economics.¹⁶⁰ Though espoused ten years ago, this idea has manifested itself into a possible new security relationship in 2001. A new security partnership has been proposed by the Australians that would seek to stabilize the region by having Japan take a more active part in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan said that it was willing to consider a new process of security dialogue involving Australia, Japan, the U.S., and possibly the ROK.¹⁶¹ The idea of this organization is to supplement the existing organizations in the region while further developing the Japanese role, in conjunction with Australia, in the security areas of peace and stability. The following section will discuss political and economic linkages as a means by which the Japanese government is seeking stability in the Asia-Pacific through the Korean Energy Development Organization.

¹⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign affairs, Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Japan's Diplomatic Activities*, 204.

¹⁶⁰ Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, 65-66.

¹⁶¹ Millett, Michael, "Japan Open to U.S. Push For Regional Alliance," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 August 01.

1. Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

Northeast Asia is Japan's own backyard and of most immediate concern. The government of Japan has allowed itself to be a part of various organizations to help enhance security in this region. While no one organization or framework is more important than the other is, Japanese support of the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is probably the most relevant. Since its inception in 1994, KEDO has laid out a framework in which North Korea freezes its nuclear program in exchange for two light water reactors (LWR) and a supply of heavy oil until the LWRs completion. The U.S. government picked up the bill for the oil and a portion of the LWR project, while South Korea (70%), Japan (over 20%) and the European Union (approximately 2%) pick-up the remaining \$4.6-5.1 billion dollar price tag for the LWR.¹⁶² Since General Electric pulled its bid for the LWR, Japanese businesses will be building the reactors as well.

For a marginal amount of aid, Japanese diplomats have had informal coordination, and unofficial bilateral relations with the government of North Korea, as well as those of China and South Korea.¹⁶³ By offering the North Korean government an incentive to negotiate with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and U.S., KEDO established a functioning model of multilateral cooperation in security matters in Northeast Asia. Such security dialogue increases confidence building and transparency between nations.¹⁶⁴

Whether or not the framework results in a permanent peace concerning nuclear arms control, the dialogues and confidence building measures between the Northeast Asian participants (Japan, and the two Koreas), and regional actors (China, Russia, and the U.S.) may bring even greater stability to the region. Considering the lack of a Northeast Asian security regime, the 1994 Agreed Framework may be unknowingly

¹⁶² Kirk, Don "U.S. Aide Backs Shift on North Korean Deal," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 March 2001.

¹⁶³ Joint statement Between the US and ROK, 7 March 2001.

¹⁶⁴ Advisory Group on Defense Issues (Japan), *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, (Tokyo? : s.n., 1994), 14. [herein cited AGDI, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan*]

sowing the seeds of a mechanism that will assist in providing transparency, stability, and top level governmental dialogue in the region.

2. Southeast Asia

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) founding principle in 1967 was to achieve peace and security by increasing trust, confidence, and stability of its members to enhance common economic and developmental interests.¹⁶⁵ Like Japan, ASEAN prefers regional stability to fighting over individual issues.¹⁶⁶ Japanese policy makers see ASEAN as representing a strong Asian identity. In his article “Asians: Drawing Together to Confront Their Own Problems,” Patrick Smith referred to *Asians* as, “prefer[ring] their own solutions, in whatever form, for the many political, economic, and social challenges confronting them.”¹⁶⁷

As compared with other regions in the world, this cooperation among Asian countries is still developing and a more effective relationship is required to meet the demands of regional development and the challenges brought by globalization. Consequently, Japanese officials were instrumental in the formation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Set up in 1993, the ARF is the only region-wide, governmental-level, multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. Current membership includes the ten ASEAN nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) plus Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the PRC, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. Some consider the ARF too weak due to the slow nature of its decision-making processes and inability to reach consensus. Consequently, the Conference on Security Cooperation Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP) can compliment the ARF in increasing cooperative dialogue, transparency, and building a framework of

¹⁶⁵ Bilson Kurus, “ASEAN-izing Southeast Asia,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ed.), *Trends*, No. 60, Aug 26-27, 1995, from website: ias.leidenuniv.nl/iiasn/iiasn6/southeas/asean.html, 12 Feb 01.

¹⁶⁶ Pugh, Michael, “Maritime Disputes in the China Seas,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review – Yearbook*, 31 Dec 1994 (: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 1994), 109.

¹⁶⁷ Patrick Smith, “Asians: Drawing Together to Confront Their Own Problems,” *International Herald Tribune*, 5 March 2001.

cooperation.¹⁶⁸ Japanese decision makers hope that regional organizations like these can assist in mitigating the realist security issues in the region.

3. Economic Diplomacy

Japanese foreign policy objectives of peace and stability in the region can be seen in its economic assistance to and investment in other Asian nations through Japanese official developmental assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI). The government of Japan seeks to lead Asia into a better position in the world but through interdependence rather than military might. Table 1 demonstrates that Asian countries receive the bulk of Japanese ODA.

1996			1997			1998		
Country	Amount (\$mil)	Share (%)	Country	Amount (\$mil)	Share (%)	Country	Amount (\$mil)	Share (%)
Indonesia	965.53	11.55	China	576.86	6.90	China	1,158.16	13.86
China	861.73	10.31	Indonesia	496.86	5.95	Indonesia	828.47	9.91
Thailand	664	7.95	India	491.8	5.89	Thailand	558.42	6.68
India	579.26	6.93	Thailand	468.26	5.60	India	504.95	6.04
Philippines	414.45	4.96	Philippines	318.98	3.82	Pakistan	491.54	5.88
Pakistan	282.2	3.38	Vietnam	232.48	2.78	Vietnam	388.61	4.65
Mexico	212.84	2.55	Jordan	139.63	1.67	Philippines	297.55	3.56
Egypt	201.32	2.41	Sri Lanka	134.56	1.61	Sri Lanka	197.85	2.37
Bangladesh	174.03	2.08	Bangladesh	129.98	1.56	Bangladesh	189.05	2.26
Sri Lanka	173.94	2.08	Egypt	125.4	1.50	Malaysia	179.1	2.14
Total	4,529.30	54.20	Total	3,114.82	37.28	Total	4,793.70	57.37
Total Bilateral Aid	8,356.26	100	Total Bilateral Aid	6,612.59	100	Total Bilateral Aid	8,605.90	100

Note: As the figures in the table are rounded off, they do not necessarily add up to the totals.

Source: MOFA, *Japan's Official Development Assistance Annual Report, 1999*.

Table 1. Major Recipient Countries of Japan's Bilateral ODA

The criteria for such aid were established in April 1991, by Prime Minister Kaifu. He asked the bureaucratic ministries of Japan to consider the following during decision-making related to giving aid and investment:¹⁶⁹

- Is the recipient nation developing and manufacturing weapons of mass destruction?
- Is it promoting democracy?
- Is it making efforts to move toward a market-oriented economy?

¹⁶⁸ AGDI, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan*, 9.

¹⁶⁹ Mochizuki, Mike M., *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 35. [herein cited Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*]

- What is its human rights record?

Additionally, in an attempt to promote disarmament and limit the sale of weapons, Japanese officials have also tried to use ODA incentives to curtail “continuous and excessive military spending,” poor human rights, or exporting arms or weapons technology.¹⁷⁰ However, while such criteria are established as an ideal that Japanese institutions strive to follow, the Japanese government has looked at countries in a case-by-case fashion. For example, China has managed to escape these criteria or at least have more weight placed on some criteria while ignoring others. Consequently, Japanese diplomats have engaged Chinese leaders to improve peace, stability, and harmony in the region even though isolated by others in the international community (i.e.: the United States) for human rights violations.

Region Sub-region/Country	1997		1998		1999		1H 2000	
	Amount (\$m)	Share (%)	Amount (\$m)	Share (%)	Amount (\$m)	Share (%)	Amount (\$m)	Share (%)
World	53,972	100	40,757	100	66,694	100	26,033	100
North America	21,389	39.63	10,943	26.85	24,770	37.14	8,695	33.40
United States	20,769	38.48	10,316	25.31	2,296	3.44	2,643	10.15
Europe	11,204	20.76	14,010	34.37	25,804	38.69	11,184	42.96
European Union	10,963	20.31	13,850	33.98	25,191	37.77	11,079	42.56
United Kingdom	4,118	7.63	9,780	24.00	11,718	17.57	7,705	29.60
Netherlands	3,295	6.11	2,118	5.20	10,361	15.54	1,896	7.28
Germany	732	1.36	553	1.36	649	0.97	233	0.90
France	1,736	3.22	521	1.28	1,127	1.69	231	0.89
Asia	12,181	22.57	6,528	16.02	7,162	10.74	2,821	10.84
East Asia	11,094	20.56	6,169	15.14	6,825	10.23	2,665	10.24
Asian NIEs	3,411	6.32	1,765	4.33	3,198	4.80	1,154	4.43
ROK	442	0.82	303	0.74	980	1.47	454	1.74
Taiwan	450	0.83	224	0.55	285	0.43	191	0.73
Hong Kong	695	1.29	602	1.48	971	1.46	318	1.22
Singapore	1,824	3.38	636	1.56	962	1.44	190	0.73
ASEAN	5,696	10.55	3,340	8.19	2,876	4.31	1,109	4.26
Malaysia	791	1.47	514	1.26	526	0.79	110	0.42
Thailand	1,867	3.46	1,371	3.36	816	1.22	435	1.67
Indonesia	2,514	4.66	1,076	2.64	918	1.38	234	0.90
Philippines	524	0.97	379	0.93	617	0.93	330	1.27
China	1,987	3.68	1,065	2.61	751	1.13	402	1.54
Latin America	6,336	11.74	6,163	15.12	7,437	11.15	3,088	11.86
Middle East	471	0.87	146	0.36	113	0.17	16	0.06
Africa	332	0.62	444	1.09	515	0.77	8	0.03
Oceania	2,058	3.81	2,213	5.43	894	1.34	221	0.85

Note: As the figures in the table are rounded off, they do not necessarily add up to the totals.

Source: Calculated using data from JETRO, *White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, 2001: Accelerated Corporate Realignment Through Mergers and Acquisitions (Summary)*.

Table 2. Japanese FDI by Regions and Selected Countries

Japanese leaders argue that interdependence mitigates security threats and that exchanges of technology, trade, foreign direct investment, and aid contribute to a

¹⁷⁰ Bridges, Brian, *Conflict Studies 264, Japan: Hesitant Superpower*, (London : Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), 26. [herein cited Bridges, *Conflict Studies 264, Japan: Hesitant Superpower*]

harmonious region. Table 2 demonstrates Japanese investment throughout the world to enhance the mutual interdependence needed to secure its importance and stability in the international system. Japanese trade with the world is represented in Appendix A.

While Japanese trade in Asia has been historically larger than in other regions in the world, some, like Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, would rather have the Japanese trade primarily with Asian countries. It is hoped that such Asian specific trade would further enhance the stability of the region. Japanese leaders, however, believe that integration should be constructive and open rather than constricted to a possible East Asian trading bloc.¹⁷¹ Former Finance Minister Hata Tsutomu stated in the 1992 Annual Meeting of the IMF Board of Governors meeting that, “Regional cooperation and integration should not devolve into regional blocs or resurgent protectionism. It is vital to the development of the world economy that while each region uses its own strengths to achieve development, it keeps its markets open to others, thereby promoting a multilateral free trade system.”¹⁷² Along these lines, Japanese policy makers are against the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) voting as a bloc in APEC as this would alienate Europe or the United States.

D. JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The government of Japan was honored to be selected to a rotating non-permanent position of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1956. For the last decade, Japanese leaders have been hoping to get a permanent seat on the Security Council (SC). This would be a method in which the government of Japan could not only share the economic stage with the European Union and the United States but also a political role as well in “managing international peace and stability.”¹⁷³ More importantly, however, is that the Japanese Constitution, like the UN Charter, is based on peaceful cooperation. Previous sections in this thesis have demonstrated that this is not just a political document but also a part of the Japanese character. There is no better way for Japanese policy

¹⁷¹ Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, 85.

¹⁷² Leitch, Kato, Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, 95.

¹⁷³ Daadler, *Prospects for Global Leadership Sharing: The Security Dimension*, 28.

makers to further their ideals of cooperation, peace, and stability and share its experiences in doing so than through participation in a worldwide organization like the United Nations. This experience would give the Japanese an objective view of conflict due to its peace constitution.¹⁷⁴ It would also allow Japanese officials to fill the roles and responsibilities described above more effectively.¹⁷⁵

The UN Charter prohibits the use of force, except for the common interests of the international community, and suggests the use of peaceful means to settle disputes.¹⁷⁶ Since these ideals coincide with Japan's peace constitution, Japanese leaders should be able to exercise its "expertise" in the area to settle disputes and resolve crises before they result in war. Unfortunately, up until the 1990s, with the exception of official development assistance (ODA), Japanese leaders have used its constitution to side step any collective action directed by the UN. However, the Japanese government has been exercising and loosening the restrictions of its constitution to meet its desire of achieving a permanent UNSC seat. Japanese leaders have sent Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Cambodia (1992) and most recently to East Timor (2001). Additionally, Japanese nationals have held key positions as chairman of the UN High Commission on Refugees, and as head of the UN Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).¹⁷⁷

However, all is not well for Japanese officials and their desires for a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is somewhat hypocritical for a nation whose constitution balks at the notion of collective security to be permanently involved in an arm of the UN that determines whether or not collective action needs to be taken in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. It was not until the 1990s that JSDF were even involved in UN PKO missions. In 1992, however, the Japanese Diet signed the Peacekeeping Operations

¹⁷⁴ Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, 206.

¹⁷⁵ Japanese Forum on International Relations, *Japan's Initiatives Towards U.S., China, and Russia*, www.jfir.or.jp/e-jf-pr-18/pr18-summary.html, 29 Aug 01.

¹⁷⁶ *United Nations Charter*, <http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html>, 8 October 01.

¹⁷⁷ Leitch, Kato, and Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, 205-206.

(PKO) law that allowed for no more than 2,000 troops to be assigned to PKO. These troops could only carry small arms (pistols) for self-defense and can only provide logistical/refugee support provided there is a cease-fire in place.¹⁷⁸ Since the signing of this law, Japanese SDF have served in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, as well as conducting minesweeping in the Gulf, and the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights.¹⁷⁹ Most recently, 400 Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) troops are scheduled to go to East Timor in the spring of 2002 to take part in peacekeeping operations that will consist of road construction.¹⁸⁰ Government reports indicate that 1,200 GSDF (the approximate number of troops sent to Cambodia in 1992-1993) may be sent to East Timor.

To be a world leader, the government of Japan will need to have an active and constructive security policy, which will promote multinational cooperation on security issues.¹⁸¹ Japan's territorial disputes have demonstrated its ability to incorporate foreign policy aims through traditional methods tempered with western influence. Japanese desire for peaceful resolution of its territorial disputes is representative of the way in which Japan's foreign policy has emerged after the Cold War. The government of Japan has mitigated protracted disputes of territory to advance peace and stability.

¹⁷⁸ Bridges, *Conflict Studies* 264, *Japan: Hesitant Superpower*, 21.

¹⁷⁹ Bessho, *Adelphi Paper 325: Identities and Security in East Asia*, 21.

¹⁸⁰ Asahi Shimbun, "SDF Troops to Join E. Timor Mission," *Asahi Shimbun* (English edition), 6 September 01.

¹⁸¹ AGDI, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan*, 6-11.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

Japanese leaders have developed a western-style perspective on conflict management that incorporates traditional Japanese concepts of order and cooperation. Examples of Japanese contributions to the activities of regional organizations include assistance in strengthening the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Trilateral Coordination and Organizational Group, the Asian Development Bank, and the Korean Energy Development Organization.

In addition to giving monetary aid for development, Japanese policy makers have developed suggestions for conflict prevention and crisis management in its *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*. The following is a synopsis of those suggestions:¹⁸²

- actors should fill roles according to their comparative advantage;
- solid coordination must be used to prevent overlap or possibly negating previous efforts by another actor; and,
- a forum should exist that allows for dynamism and initiative.

Additionally, Japanese decision makers want the UN and NGOs to take the lead in conflict prevention and crisis management by creating international initiatives and policies. The Japanese believe that this process of communication should be routine in nature among all actors involved, and not reactive to crises. This will increase cooperation, coordination and ultimately, prevent conflict.

Japanese officials also have other methods of stemming conflict. Contrary to Japanese Cold War practices, the Japanese government now states: “Governments are requested to increase flexibility in their management of ODA and to share information, with a view to assisting and encouraging NGOs engaged in conflict prevention.”¹⁸³ It also recommends education as way of conflict prevention in non-conflicting countries as a means of helping to resolve conflicts abroad. Additionally, NGOs, as autonomous and

¹⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2000*.

¹⁸³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Symposium Culture of Prevention, Multi-Actor Coordination from UN to Civil Society - Chairman’s Summary, [translation by MOFA], 9 Mar 01, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/conflict/sympo0103/summary.html>, 27 May 01.

independent agencies, can assist in this training, and possibly assist in reconciling differences between conflicting parties.

A. JAPANESE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

A Japanese conflict management style has emerged throughout this thesis. Most notable is the concept of communal harmony at the expense of the individual. This higher sense of community, however, was only expressed when dealing with other Japanese within the confines of a centralized governing force, either provincially, or countrywide. This came, of course, in the form of what some may consider oppressive regimes with little to no individualism. The Japanese, however, made up for this by ensuring that a certain amount of consensus was needed in making important decisions. It is here that the individual (the elites in charge) could express their concerns and issues before a decision is made. This communication and harmony broke down during two periods that were evaluated, the Warring States Period, and the first half of the twentieth century. It must be noted, however, that even during these times, Japanese focus has been on the survivability of the national ideals of Shintoism. These ideals encompassed the traditional notion of state before self, domestic peace above conflict, and Japanese uniqueness always.

Japanese leaders have attempted to Japanize western concepts of conflict management. Surprisingly enough, westernized concepts of peace and cooperation dovetail nicely with pre-modern concepts of Japanese conflict management skills. Consequently, the Japanese can effectively operate in such dialogues. Unfortunately, Japanese officials have not always been effective in applying its conflict management skills when realist, power politics influence the world stage. During the Cold War, when Japan diplomats were in similar situations, Tokyo would need to adapt its foreign policy to that of the larger powers. However, since the end of the Cold War, Japanese leaders has been able to stand a bit more independently and create a cooperative system which is unique, from a western perspective, while still satisfying all the parties' interests. It is this flexibility and responsiveness that has allowed the government of Japan to compete with two major world powers, and hotly contested rivals in its territorial disputes.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

From an official Japanese stance, the Northern Territories are undergoing positive talks, South Korean officials should allow the Takeshima debate to go before an international court, and the Senkaku Islands are not under dispute. Some may argue that this is no way to manage a conflict. However, after analyzing the major facets of the territorial disputes, it is not difficult to conclude that from a political and economic standpoint, the issue of these territorial disputes has been resolved. Although there is debate as to which country possesses the territories, the conflicts over these territories have provided the arena to allow for diplomatic discourse, understanding, and trade. This can be seen in the many trade, and diplomatic treaties that specifically address the territories in dispute. Nationalism and territorial sovereignty, unfortunately, have muddied the waters and provided all parties some hoops to jump through, to placate domestic opinion. It is obvious that not until several generations have passed will the issue of nationalism be resolved. As for the territorial sovereignty issue, the following recommendations are made:¹⁸⁴

1. Japanese diplomats need to sit with each of its neighbors, either bilaterally or with an unbiased third party, and review all the documents. From this position of knowledge will come understanding. This has been done in the Northern Territories and Senkaku Islands.
2. The parties must systematically go through the documents and work through their issues until agreements can be made. In those instances where there is a contentious issue, or “hot spot,” it should be shelved so as not to interrupt the process of cooperation. This has been accomplished with all of the disputes considering the diplomatic and economic relations that have been ongoing.
3. The “hot spots” must be boxed off to prevent any further antagonism of the situation. This will not only prevent further chances of conflict, but

¹⁸⁴ These points were discovered in a discussion with Neville Maxwell, University of Oxford, on 9 June 01 at an Asian Studies of the Pacific Coast Conference.

will also deny each other the opportunity of realizing gains from the territory. In the case of residents, like in the Northern Territories, this can be unrealistic. However, by removing the resource revenues, this could provide an incentive to resolve the dispute.

4. Throughout this process, a search for commonality and understanding is paramount. The idea of not leaving until a resolution is found should be the ultimate goal. Negotiating to seek compromise will allow the participants to reach a solution. Ultimately, joint gain is preferable to the cumulative loss these countries would realize in the form of trade, diplomatic ties, and armaments.¹⁸⁵

These principles may not be as autocratic as in pre-modern Japan's centralized governments. However, they provide Japanese decision makers with the opportunity to use its concept of communication and cooperation to achieve harmony in the territorial realm.

If Japanese leaders could take the lead on these disputes, the Japanese may be able to turn international opinion in their favor and grant Japan a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Some have argued that the government of Japan would have to trade territory for the seat. It could be argued that the Japanese government does not need to give up territory at all. With the exception of the Northern Territories, over which Japanese officials were willing to accept a compromise in 1951, the territories in question provide resources and nationalist pride. The resource issue appears to have been settled and as generations pass, there is the chance that nationalism will wane over time. The Security Council seat and/or other opportunities may even assist in focusing Japanese nationalist pride elsewhere. Ultimately, any action other than peaceful resolution that favors all parties will lead to instability in the region, and a continued mistrust of Japanese intentions.

¹⁸⁵ Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," 288.

C. FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Given the government of Japan's immediate desire for peace and stability in the region, it is expected that Japanese policy makers will promote multilateral forums to compliment the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. This will include an increased role of Japanese integration in the UN as well as closer economic integration with in the region.¹⁸⁶ This will also include a modernization and re-fitting of its SDF and the possible amending of its Constitution as well. In the meantime, Japanese officials will improve efforts in Japanese intelligence functions such that they have a capability to respond to early danger signs, and ability to broaden its scope of response will not only enhance its ability to defend itself but also assist in the stability of the region.¹⁸⁷ The Japanese Defense Agency must deal with technological advances in military communications as well as U.S.-Japan joint research on a missile defense system. The NDPO will also respond to public expectations for the SDF to be sent to areas hit by natural disasters. SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations will also be stressed in the outline.¹⁸⁸

This plan for modernization should occur in concert with the existing U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. While the U.S.-Japan security alliance is not a treaty such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Japanese bilateral agreement with the United States should be developed into a more active and constructive relationship. This should include improving support to the U.S. government through intelligence sharing, joint-training off of the Japanese islands, having compatible equipment interfaces, and an Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA).¹⁸⁹ This will not only improve the relationship between the two countries but also direct modernization efforts toward peace and stability in Japan.

¹⁸⁶ Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, 69-70.

¹⁸⁷ AGDI, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan*, 11.

¹⁸⁸ Asahi Shimbun, "Defense Policy Shifting from Large-Scale Attacks," *Asahi Shimbun* (English edition), 4 September 01

¹⁸⁹ AGDI, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan*, 17.

D. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Since its westernization in the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese leaders have been playing catch-up in the realm of international politics. Consequently, the flexibility and ability to adapt by these leaders has allowed them to walk between the East and the West. Unfortunately, Japan has not been able to claim a home in either sphere successfully. Given Japanese uniqueness, however, Tokyo would not want it any other way. Against the background of the delicate balance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese leadership will need to make a stand that will conflict with both spheres. Existing American policy would indicate that the United States may not officially understand why the Japanese seek a closer relationship with Beijing than Taipei. Nor will the Chinese accept the Japanese need for a regular military force. Ultimately, Japan will stand on its own - neither eastern nor western, just Japanese.

Japanese leaders manipulated Chinese philosophy and used it to develop Japan's national character. When this Asian model was challenged by western imperialism, the Japanese adopted western thoughts on international relations into a nationalistic cause to rid themselves of subjugation and ultimately compete as equals during World War II. It was during the occupation that Japanese leaders further adapted a national character, defined through international trade and commerce. This approach was cultivated through the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government found itself in a new age of self-exploration. The recession of the 1990s and Asia monetary crisis in 1997 has forced Japanese decision makers to step back and re-evaluate Japan's status in the world.

As in the past, though, Japanese leaders will re-establish Japan in the world. Japan will be a regional leader that will depend on sharing its role with the governments of China and Australia. As a co-leader, Japan will work with the United States and its neighbors in Asia, to include Russia, in developing a regional framework to encompass trade and security. Japan will be able to do this due to its willingness to use its military forces as both a deterrent and facilitator similar to the United States' role during the Cold war. However, the difference will be that this Asian Pacific League will be based more on trade than security. The comprehensive security aspect will be used to respond to

regional conflicts that traditional forms of conflict management fail to address. The government of Japan, with those of Australia, and China, will provide the de facto police forces necessary to provide peace and stability in a very large and diverse region of the world.

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APPENDIX A. JAPANESE INTERDEPENDENCE BY REGIONS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES

Region Sub-region/Country	Japanese Imports				Japanese Exports			
	1998 Amount Share (%)	1999 Amount Share (%)	2000* Amount Share (%)	1996 Amount Share (%)	1999 Amount Share (%)	2000* Amount Share (%)	1996 Amount Share (%)	2000* Amount Share (%)
World	280,489	310,733	369,005	387,935	419,468	476,596	419,468	476,596
North America/NAFTA	76,176	77,066	82,370	130,253	141,541	154,929	130,253	154,929
United States	67,294	67,529	71,373	119,713	130,195	142,265	119,713	142,265
Europe	47,268	52,463	55,690	79,620	81,883	86,657	79,620	86,657
European Union	39,102	42,806	46,181	71,646	74,746	78,853	71,646	78,853
United Kingdom	5,849	5,935	6,510	14,568	14,249	14,859	14,568	14,859
Netherlands	1,840	1,895	1,970	11,291	12,055	12,210	11,291	12,210
Germany	10,711	11,513	12,597	19,090	18,698	20,160	19,090	20,160
France	5,738	6,149	6,224	6,197	6,841	7,508	6,197	7,508
Russian Federation	2,910	3,767	4,226	97.0	484	563	97.0	563
Asia	118,999	137,916	173,964	143,756	166,351	205,109	143,756	205,109
East Asia	54,084	65,837	83,735	90,330	105,264	131,862	90,330	131,862
Asian NIEs	24,096	30,731	38,921	63,528	74,294	93,571	63,528	93,571
ROK	12,116	16,138	19,893	15,400	23,089	30,604	15,400	30,604
Taiwan	10,237	12,805	17,375	25,601	29,058	36,192	25,601	36,192
Hong Kong	1,733	0.56	1.653	22,528	22,147	26,775	22,528	26,775
ASEAN**	23,952	28,868	36,988	20,886	24,844	31,442	20,886	31,442
Brunei	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Camodia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Indonesia	10,840	12,617	15,914	4,302	4,908	7,436	4,302	7,436
Laos	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Malaysia	8,686	10,944	14,052	9,330	11,153	13,836	9,330	13,836
Myanmar	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Philippines	4,427	5,308	7,021	7,266	8,783	10,170	7,266	10,170
Singapore	4,717	5,437	6,130	14,780	16,345	20,662	14,780	20,662
Thailand	8,170	8,875	10,302	9,346	11,358	13,542	9,346	13,542
Vietnam	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
China	37,082	43,070	52,817	20,104	23,450	29,982	20,104	29,982
Australia and New Zealand	14,946	14,696	16,861	9,196	9,934	10,200	9,196	10,200
South Asia and Others	6,046	6,238	7,826	5,904	6,126	6,848	5,904	6,848
Central and Latin America	7,774	7,686	8,517	15,366	13,615	14,808	15,366	14,808
Middle East	25,565	30,654	46,345	12,442	9,833	9,394	12,442	9,394
Africa	3,670	4,073	4,843	5,718	5,333	5,080	5,718	5,080
Oceania	796	814	885	550	650	439	550	439

Notes: As the figures in the table are rounded off, they do not necessarily add up to the totals.

* Amount in Millions of U.S. dollars

** Selected ASEAN countries shown

Source: Calculated using data from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Monthly Statistics of International Trade*, November 2000.

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